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LAW’S PUBLIC/PRIVATE STRUCTURE
CHRISTIAN TURNER
Abstract
Often derided for its incoherence or uselessness, the public/private distinction is rarely
studied explicitly outside the state action doctrine in Constitutional Law. To ignore this
distinction, however, is to miss the most fundamental sorting criterion in our law.
Distinguishing whether public or private entities control (a) law creation and definition and
(b) prosecution leads to a simple yet powerful taxonomy of legal systems. The taxonomy
characterizes legal systems in terms of control over decisionmaking by our most basic
institutional forms: the public and private. Thus, the proper categorization of laws within
the system, for example whether a policy should be administered by Tort or by Contract,
should depend on the relative institutional capacities of public and private actors. I propose
a small set of basic, or “atomic,” arguments concerning public and private capacities that
can be used to generate such institutional comparisons.
The taxonomic model unifies formerly disparate areas of law and scholarship around
simple arguments concerning the relative advantages of public and private institutions.
This method has many implications, and the Article begins to explore several, including a
comparison of private and public Constitutional Law, the placement of various kinds of
laws in the model's schema, an application to the recent Supreme Court case of Robertson v.
United States ex rel. Watson, and a unification of substantive classification and the
property and liability rules of Calabresi’s and Melamed’s famous Cathedral.
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I. INTRODUCTION
All legal systems possess a common, elementary structure.
Although law’s contents and methods obviously differ wildly among
societies, it is nonetheless possible and useful to view legal systems
as highly individuated descendants of a bare and neutral template.
Identifying the right sort of descriptive template reveals deep
connections among and within legal systems, connections that
reframe many of law’s larger questions: Why do we have contract,
tort, and criminal law? Are these subjects merely idiosyncratic
developments within particular legal systems or are they universal
legal categories? Is the constitutional law governing tort and criminal
law similar to the law that governs contract interpretation and
enforcement? Is there a way to reduce complex, subject-specific legal
issues to more basic and trans-substantive normative questions?
In this Article, I describe a theory of legal systems that provides
answers to these and other questions. The taxonomy at the heart of
the theory derives its analytical power from a single idea: that the
most fundamental legal questions concern the choice between public
and private decisionmaking.
This may seem surprising. Many have assumed that the
public/private distinction is long dead. Slain by Duncan Kennedy in
1982,1 it is now seldom observed outside the strained, ends-driven
1. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). Kennedy used the public/private distinction as a paradigmatic
example of an apparently sharp legal distinction that is destined to collapse via a
predictable process: (1) the emergence of “hard cases with large stakes,” (2) legal
recognition of intermediate categories, (3) the recognition that every case is an
intermediate one in some respect, (4) an attempt to salvage the distinction by arguing that
it is in fact a spectrum between idealized poles, (5) the development of canned, opposing
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reasoning found here and there among the pages of the U.S. Reports.
What appears to be “private” can always be characterized as
“public.”2 Private contracts, after all, are public to the extent they are
enforced by courts. Conversely, the public acts through private
individuals who occupy positions in the government. The arguments
for labeling an activity or institution “public” or “private” are as
predictable as the difference between them is indeterminate. It is
therefore not surprising that relatively little scholarship has
attempted an interdisciplinary analysis of the role the public/private
distinction plays in our law.
To ignore the distinction, however, is to miss the most basic
sorting criterion in our legal system. Indeed, separating public from
private is an inevitable task in any legal system. To form a
government is to agree first and foremost on those decisions a
collective will make together and those it will leave for its
constituents. Appreciating the differences between public and private
control of lawmaking and administration is the key to answering the
questions posed above.
To achieve this and to overcome the specter of indeterminacy, we
must first recognize that most of our legal interactions and
institutions have both public and private aspects. Often, the reason
the distinction appears muddied or mixed is that a single dispute
involves public and private control over different questions.
For example, Morton Horwitz cites Fuller and Perdue’s work on
contract damages to argue that contract is not entirely “private,”
since contract damages are state-imposed sanctions that are
calibrated to achieve policy ends.3 This argument is correct as far as
it goes. Most contract disputes are not solely governed by “private
law.” While their adjudication is initiated by a private individual and
is governed by privately created law, they often, though not
invariably,4 result in publicly determined remedies: court-ordered
damages. These questions appear mixed in nature because they are
not resolved entirely by the public or entirely by private individuals,
but in fact the public/private distinction critically informs each
dimension of the conflict separately. By focusing narrowly on the
arguments, which can be made in every case, concerning an issue’s placement on the
spectrum, and finally (6) what Kennedy calls “loopification,” wherein the poles of the
spectrum are drawn closely together. See id. at 1350-57.
2. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948) (holding that the
enforcement of private covenants by public courts is “state action”); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501, 505-07 (1946) (finding a private, company town was a state actor because it
exercised “public function[s]”).
3. Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1423, 1426 (1982).
4. See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
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difference between public and private control over discrete legal
decisions, much of the difficulty of indeterminacy is avoided.
I exploit this basic and more focused distinction between public
and private decisionmaking to construct a simple taxonomy that
provides important insight into the structure of legal systems. This is
not a “theory of everything.” Quite plainly, one cannot hope to
characterize all legal systems in minute detail by asking only a few
questions. But it is possible to see that many seemingly disparate legal
issues are differently costumed aspects of the public/private dichotomy,
nonetheless governed by fundamentally the same arguments.
The questions I pose to sort the laws of a legal system are: Is the
law publicly or privately made? Is its adjudication publicly or
privately initiated?5 From the binary sequence of answers that
results from the first two questions, we will obtain a taxonomy of
laws that corresponds roughly with the traditional categories of tort,
contract, and criminal law.
The central purpose of this approach is to show that legal systems
can be ordered by discrete choices between public and private
decisionmaking, thus reframing many legal issues as questions of
basic, institutional choice: that between public and private actors.
While the literature abounds with analyses of the institutional
dynamics of, say, legislatures and courts,6 the much more elemental
divide between public and private entities has yet to be fully and
systematically explored. Doing so will permit us to understand more
precisely, across the legal landscape, what our legal disagreements
actually concern by reducing complex arguments to questions of
institutional competency.
With the descriptive taxonomy in hand, we can predict how a
society will, and argue normatively how it should, structure its laws
based on the application of interdisciplinary, “atomic” arguments
concerning only the differing capacities of public agents and private
individuals. I call them “atomic,” because they are the basic elements
from which compound arguments concerning legal regulation are
constructed. Much of what at first appears to be subject-specific
argumentation over questions such as whether to permit certain

5. These are rough versions of the taxonomic criteria. They will be made more
precise infra. In addition to these, I also explore a third question: Are the consequences of
its violation publicly or privately determined? I will argue that this yields the distinction
between property rules and liability rules, thus unifying important aspects of Calabresi
and Melamed’s “Cathedral.” See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262-67 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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kinds of contracts and whether to recognize various torts is only a
composition of a small number of trans-substantive, atomic arguments.
Stated roughly, these atoms are arguments that either public
institutions or private entities: (1) are good at estimating the
decision’s impact on others (which of them has a “private calculation
advantage”), (2) are unselfish within the context of the decision
(which has a “distributive advantage”), (3) are able to evaluate the
decision according to public norms (which has a “public calculation
advantage”), and (4) are able to effect the decision (which has a
“resource advantage”).7 Armed with a model that defines legal
systems in terms of public and private control and a set of elemental
arguments to evaluate public and private competencies, it is possible
to predict and critique the structure of a given legal system.
I begin, in the next Part, by describing the fundamental
public/private distinctions, those between public and private law
creation and public and private prosecution (or law enforcement).
These distinctions together result in a two-dimensional model of legal
systems, populated with the familiar categories of Contract, Tort, and
Criminal Law, along with an unfamiliar and interesting category I
call Parens Patriae.8
In Part III, I define the atomic arguments that can be made in
favor of public or private decisionmaking. Again, they are “atomic”
because they compose the seemingly more complicated and specific
arguments that define, classify, and limit laws within a legal system.
In Part IV, I use the atomic public/private arguments to derive
trans-substantive, secondary rules that can be used to categorize law
appropriately within the model and to constrain the actors that make
law and prosecute violations. The doctrinal importance of
understanding these boundaries was brought to the fore in a recent
United States Supreme Court case, Robertson v. United States ex. rel.
Watson, that raised the question whether criminal contempt could be
prosecuted by a private party.9
In conclusion, I indicate further applications of the model, from
pedagogy to property to pluralism. The applications are far-reaching,
as the model reveals that much of law’s apparently complex structure
results from the same, simple form repeated in overlapping ways,
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. I will emphasize again, infra Part II.A, that these labels are suggestive only. They
are not perfectly isomorphic with any Restatement’s definition of the body of, say, tort law
or contract law. But being suggestive, and thus motivating intuition, at the risk of some
confusion is worth the costs. In an effort to avoid ambiguity, I will capitalize the categories
in the taxonomy and leave uncapitalized the tort law, contract law, criminal, and even
constitutional law of the Restatements and casebooks.
9. 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010).
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and at different scales. While the content of individual laws cannot
always be understood this way, law’s broad contours inevitably must
be. To put it differently, not all laws are made of the atoms that are
the discrete ways of dividing public from private. But law’s skeleton is.
II. THE TAXONOMY
The public/private distinction is among what Norberto Bobbio has
elegantly described as one of our species’ “ ‘great dichotomies,’ ” and
it is therefore no surprise that it provides a lens into the fundamental
structure of legal culture.10 Such dichotomies, Bobbio tells us, (a)
divide the world into two mutually exclusive categories and (b)
subsume other important distinctions.11 The aim of this Article is to
show how the public/private distinction subsumes a host of seemingly
unrelated legal questions. Much of law’s structure and many of its
specific questions turn out to be secondary to this Great Dichotomy
applied to two basic legal questions.
The initial goal, in this Part, is purely descriptive. The taxonomy
is, on one level, a formal classification.12 It is inarguably a way to
categorize legal systems. That it is, both conceptually and
normatively, a useful way to do so will be demonstrated in the Parts
that follow.
I claim a bit more, however. Every legal system in fact grapples
with the public/private questions I ask here. This is so because every
collective must decide with respect to the basic questions that
innervate the two-dimensional construct I describe (loosely: law
creation and prosecution) whether to act individually or together.
The taxonomy therefore provides a description of the actual decisions
facing any collective and every legal system.13 Even if individuals do

10. NORBERTO BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF
STATE POWER 1 (Peter Kennealy trans., 1989).
11. Id. at 1-2.
12. Emily Sherwin has helpfully described a number of ways that classification in
legal theory proceeds. Emily Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy, 15 LEGAL THEORY 25, 28 (2009). In
her taxonomy of taxonomies, my approach would be called a “formal classification.” See id.
at 33-34. This is so because my “predominant concern is with the internal logical
relationship among legal categories rather than the social functions of or higher-order
reasons for the legal rules grouped within them.” Id at 33. As Sherwin points out, such
classifications, so long as logically sound, cannot claim to be correct or incorrect. See id. at
33-34. As such, it is either useful or not, but it is a category error to ask whether it is right.
13. I use the term “collective” here to make clear that the theory also applies to
entities other than what we formally recognize as “states.” A private organization is a
collective, and it has a legal system, however informal, that governs whatever coercion it
can apply. Though the collective is “private” when viewed from the perspective of the state
in which it is embedded, it is “public” when viewed as a self-contained legal system, even if
subject to the constraints imposed by a hierarchically superior public, like the state. See,
e.g., infra note 64 (discussing how private entities within a legal system may form their
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not consciously think of the public/private distinction when
constructing the legal system that will govern them, they nonetheless
make choices concerning it that are of fundamental importance.14
After all, law is a collective’s self-conscious scheme to govern the
imposition of whatever coercion the collective is able to muster. Basic
to the application of coercion is the question of what conditions will
trigger its application. In other words, the collective must ask under
what circumstances it will even consider coercion (the enforcement,
or initiation, question) and how it will decide whether to coerce once
it does consider it (the law creation question). And basic to these
questions is the choice between granting to the collective itself or to
individuals the power to answer them.15
A surprising degree of understanding concerning optimal
classification and even content of law can be gained by combining
this taxonomic model, the atomic public/private arguments I describe
in the next Part, and some information concerning the norms of the
collective. It is this additional, collective-specific information that is
critical to reaching normative conclusions. I explore some examples
in Part IV.
But without knowledge of the collective’s wants, the taxonomy
provides no normative critique of the collective’s legal system, only a
method of classifying its law according to the basic choices it has
made.16 Once defined, the taxonomy categorizes relentlessly and
own “public,” perhaps inferior to the one in which it is embedded, and citing sources that
describe non-governmental collectives and private ordering).
14. Some support for the ontological nature of the model derives from its neat
alignment with the major distinctions found across many modern and ancient legal
systems. Nearly all legal systems that in fact have both public and private law recognize
that division as basic, by labeling it as such, teaching it as such, establishing different
courts for public and private law, and establishing different doctrinal approaches that
operate uniformly within each area. If a model is highly descriptive of the de facto practices
of divergent legal systems, then there is some evidence that the model describes an
inherent distinction within all legal systems.
15. One might say that fundamentally we specify the conditions of coercion, and prior
to that is the question of who specifies the conditions. The public/private distinction is more
fundamental than, meaning prior to, the “who” question. If the collective allows, under
some circumstances, any member to specify these conditions, we say that it has deferred to
private power. If, by contrast, the collective specifies some more particular locus for the
decision, the decision is public, even if the decisionmaker is not expected to act according to
public norms. The point is that in the latter case the public controls the identity of the
decisionmaker. Subsequent to this determination, that it will select the decisionmaker,
the public moves to the subsidiary question of how such decisionmaker is determined.
This sort of “who” question is one of substantive Constitutional Law, as we shall see in
Part II.B infra.
16. As Sherwin puts it:
A formal scheme of legal classification is normatively inert. By their
nature, the rules being classified are normative: a rule of law implies
institutional consequences, such as a legal right to damages. Yet the
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without judgment, providing a descriptive lens on legal systems
ranging in kind from our own to the suffocating dictatorship of the
autocrat Rex.17 It is initially with this purely descriptive goal in
mind that I construct and explain a taxonomic, institutional model
of legal systems.
A. The Basic Legal Subjects
I will focus first on two distinctions among laws that together
create four legal categories. Three of these categories are roughly
equivalent to the major substantive areas of our own legal system:
Contract, Tort, and Criminal Law. The fourth category is a bit of an
outlier in our legal culture, but not exactly an empty set.
The first distinction is between those legal norms that are created
publicly and those created privately. In short, the focus is on the
source of those rules that govern primary behavior. Thus, we will ask
whether the criteria for bringing to bear the coercive power of the
state are privately set or publicly set. A private contract is an
example of the former. A legislatively imposed highway speed limit is
an example of the latter. In contract, the parties themselves specify
the legal obligations they will undertake. They are the lawmakers.
The speed limit is set by the legislature, a public body.
Two caveats will help to sharpen the meaning of this distinction.
First, the original author of the text forming the basis of the legal
duty is immaterial. Within the category of publicly created law, the
public may incorporate standards from the private marketplace. For
example, medical malpractice torts are based on the standard of care
prevailing among private physicians. But under my taxonomy, such
torts are still publicly formulated. The question is not whether the
content of laws originates from official, deliberative bodies or from
private individuals. Rather, the question is whether the public or
private individuals control the law’s content. The public chooses to
define the medical malpractice tort based on prevailing market
standards. But no private individuals control that standard or could
classificatory scheme itself, the structural rules that shape it, and the
categories it yields have nothing to say about how courts should
decide cases.
Sherwin, supra note 12, at 34. Rather, the classification provides glue that connects
collective-specific normative commitments with deduced structural choices that may have
been less obvious without the model. See id. at 33-34.
17. Here I refer to H.L.A. Hart’s caricature in THE CONCEPT OF LAW 52 (2d ed. 1994).
Rex is a selfish tyrant who makes law for his people only to satisfy his own ends. See id.
His system occupies a polar extreme on the fully participatory/fully enslaved political
spectrum. See id. at 52-53. I will refer to him throughout, as a reminder of the normative
diversity of legal systems.
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stand in the way of its amendment. The public is the author of this
law. It has chosen how to govern instances of medical injuries. So too,
a private contract, clearly representing the choices of the parties to
the contract, can incorporate the language of others or even the
language of public laws. Doing so does not mean that others or the
public has made this law between the parties, only that the parties
have borrowed such law for their purposes. They still control.
Second, the model is only concerned with those obligations a
collective coercively enforces. Thus, private lawmaking does not
include unenforceable private agreements or privately policed norms.
Lawmaking authority that is left to private individuals must be
distinguished from those areas of our lives over which a collective
decides not to exercise its coercive powers at all.18 The latter are not a
part of this model of legal systems.19
The second distinction used to generate the taxonomy concerns
whether enforcement may be initiated privately or publicly. Who
makes the “decision to decide” whether the collective will coerce? May
an individual require the group to apply its rules, whatever they are,
to decide whether to compel another to pay some kind of
compensation? Or does the group itself determine whether it will
render a decision ordering one to do what he or she wishes not to do?
In other words: who can “call the question”—private parties or
only the public? I will often, risking some ambiguity for the sake of
brevity, refer to the resolution of this question as being in favor of
either public or private “enforcement.” By enforcement, though, I
mean only the action described above, forcing the collective to
determine whether to coerce, not subsequent attempts to collect
judgments or otherwise to ensure that decisions already made are
carried out and not even the act of prosecution itself. The question is,
again, based on power. Who can force adjudication?
There are several other ways one might attempt to divide law
based on various kinds of public or private control over, say, a
18. As Tay and Kamenka put it:
[T]here is an obvious sense in which all law is social and public, preceding
any given individual and confronting him as something outside himself,
backed by the state or the community. The classification of law into public
and private is a classification within this general feature of law,
distinguishing some bodies of law from others within a single system.
Alice Erh-Soon Tay & Eugene Kamenka, Public Law – Private Law, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 67, 82 (S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus eds., 1983).
19. Of course, the group’s decisions concerning to what extent and under what
conditions it will back private decisions with group-level coercion is highly political,
meaning that they have enormous implications for and are reflective of the distributive
policies of the group.
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lawsuit. Is the litigant represented publicly or privately? Does the
remedy inure to public or private benefit? Though I briefly take up
this latter question again,20 I find more fundamental the question
posed here. What is asked is whether a private person or the public
has the power to force a collective determination, a power that
necessarily imposes the cost of deciding on the group as a whole.21
This is a fundamental question because many of the distinctions
between tort and criminal law are, at bottom, only the natural
consequences of standard distinctions between public and private
capacities when applied to the power to “call the question.”
These two distinctions—who creates duties and who enforces
duties—are basic in the following sense. Any collective will have to
decide when it will coerce its members. When conflicts arise between
a collective’s members, “the fundamental thing that law does is to
decide which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.”22 To
do this, it must decide what law to apply, whether to defer to the
desires of private individuals or to impose the will of the collective
itself. It must also determine who gets to decide whether such conflicts
should be eligible for coercive determination in the first place.
As the table below summarizes, I will affix familiar labels to the
categories created by the answers to these two questions. The area of
privately enforced, privately created duties will be called Contract
Law. The area of privately enforced, publicly created duties will be
called Tort Law. And the area of publicly created, publicly enforced
duties will be called Criminal Law. The final area, privately created
but publicly enforced duties, is an obscure one in American law but
not without content, and I will call it Parens Patriae.23
Privately Created

Publicly Created

Privately
Enforced

Contract

Tort

Publicly
Enforced

Parens Patriae

Criminal Law

20. See infra Part IV.D.
21. Even if an individual does have such power with respect to a conflict, the public
may also have the power to pursue resolution. This might be necessary, as will be further
elaborated below, if the public net benefit of resolution is greater than the private net
benefit to any individual empowered to demand resolution.
22. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1090.
23. What about Property? Perhaps to the chagrin of we who teach and love the
subject, the model demonstrates what we have long known: Property is not a fundamental
legal subject of the same sort as Tort, Criminal Law, and Contract. See infra Part V.
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Though I suggestively label these categories with the major
headings of our substantive law, I do not mean to argue, for example,
that privately created, privately enforced law is our contract law.
Rather, I am calling “Contract” all such laws. The contract law of the
states tends to fall entirely within this category. But so too does some
other law, such as gifts, easements, and real covenants, which might
not be considered “contract law” by some. “Tort,” in this Article,
means all publicly created, privately enforced laws, not the set of law
that a jurisdiction itself labels “tort law.” Thus, statutes that provide
private rights of action are “Tort” laws under my taxonomy, even
though some might consider at least some such laws something other
than “tort law.”
On the one hand, these headings are only labels. I am not directly
entering the debate over questions such as: “What is (our) tort law?”
Rather, the effort here is to observe that law is fundamentally
different depending on whether various aspects of it come under
public or private control. The resulting categories need labels, and I
have given them highly suggestive ones. Unfortunately, maintaining
the appropriate suggestion of what these categories are comes at the
cost of potentially confusing them with the bodies of law described in
Restatements bearing their names.
On the other hand, the fact that our tort law, our contract law,
and our criminal law generally do fit within these categories is no
accident. It is demonstrative of the fact that all societies must wrestle
with how to divide control over law between the public and its
members. Given the inherent capacities and limitations of public
institutions and private citizens, it should not be surprising that
many societies resolve these divisions similarly.
B. Meta-Law: Constitutional Law and Procedure
Every public has some means for creating and recognizing the
duties that will be analyzed in a case and some means for orderly
processing decisions whether to coerce. I call these two sets of
methods Constitutional Law and Procedure, respectively.
Constitutional Law
Privately Created Publicly Created

Procedure

Privately
Enforced

Contract

Tort

Publicly
Enforced

Parens Patriae

Criminal Law
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This additional structure might seem at first to be driven by a
desire to add in the bits of law not obviously covered by the four
categories so far derived. In fact, the public/private perspective of
legal systems turns out to be a helpful way to understand the array
of secondary rules, power-conferring fragments of law, “legal rights,”
and other meta-law. What I call Constitutional Law is the entire set
of secondary rules that governs the making of laws, and by
Procedure, I mean the set of secondary rules that governs the
adjudication of alleged breaches of the laws.
In this fashion, I propose a unified way of thinking about the
meta-rules of privately created and publicly created law. To take up
but one implication of this understanding, I will focus on the metalaw of Contract. While the course of study in law school commonly
called “torts” is primarily about the substantive rules of that area,
the subject commonly called “contracts” is mostly, and often entirely,
a study of what I call the Constitutional Law of Contract.24
If we think of Constitutional Law, generally, as describing the
structure of a collective’s decisionmaking entities, including
contracting private parties, and the extent of the powers of those
entities (i.e., their rulemaking authority and obligations to respect
rights), then it should be obvious that the body of law we call
“contracts” is really a field of Constitutional Law. Indeed, the study
of “contract law” could hardly be other than a study of structure and
rights. The substantive legal duties created by contract law are
elaborated in countless contracts and are not easily amenable to
systematic study. Moreover, “substantive contract law,” the
obligations actually established through particular contracts, is
generally far less instructive, even for the transactional lawyer, than a
combination of (a) the law governing recognition of privately created
law, i.e. the Constitutional Law of Contracts, and (b) the particular
substance of typical contracts in the lawyer’s field of concentration.
So, returning to the constitutional questions of Contract Law, how
do private members of a collective create enforceable duties? How do
they “pass laws”? In our system, individuals may do so through
mutual assent manifested in a particular manner of offer and
24. As with the substantive labels (Contract, Tort, Criminal Law, and Parens
Patriae), I use the phrases Constitutional Law and Constitutional Law of Contract in a
specialized manner. As will be made clear below, I do not mean by the Constitutional Law
of Contract, our existing constitutional doctrines constraining governmental impairment of
contracts or otherwise relating to public regulation of contracts. I mean the metalaw
governing the structure and rights pertaining to private lawmaking. Who can make a
contract? How can they do so? What kinds of contracts are they permitted to make? Can a
contract be struck down for regulating in forbidden areas? These are the questions resolved
by the Constitutional Law of Contract, just as their public analogues are answered by
Constitutional Law.
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acceptance. But there is more structure in our own Constitutional
Law of Contract than is contained in even the elaboration of what
counts as an offer and what counts as an acceptance. There are rough
standards, sometimes vague and sometimes not, concerning the
identities of the rule promulgators: age requirements, restrictions on
dealing with those of less than sound minds, and more. There are
rules concerning the procedures for “passage”: the statute of frauds,
the mailbox rules, meeting of the minds, and consideration.25 There
are rules concerning interpretation in the face of ambiguity and
silence, resulting in presumptions and default rules—just as there
are for public statutes.26 There are constraints on substance: the rule
that contracts do not impose obligations on nonparties,27 the rule
against illegal contracts, the rule against unreasonable restraints
on alienation, and the rule, in general, against agreements that
violate public policy.28 All of these serve the same functional
purpose as the analogous public constitutional rules concerning
structure and lawmaking.
Just as on the public side, private laws are constrained by rights.
It should come as no surprise that every “right” can also be viewed as
a kind of structural limitation. Scholars of the constitutional law of
Crime and Tort have long identified and debated this parity.29 We
might, however, identify rights in Contract Law as established
chiefly by the unconscionability doctrine, which interestingly tracks
the procedural and substantive due process doctrines of our
constitutional law,30 the very doctrines that that have been read to be
25. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation
and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 427 (2000) (discussing how these doctrines
serve the “objective theory” to determine whether a contract exists or not).
26. See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110
Ethics 5 (1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=19384 (observing the similarity
between presumptions in both contract law and statutory interpretation designed to fill in
what the lawmakers would have intended or to incentivize lawmakers to be clear and
disclose intentions).
27. Covenants and easements that run with the land are important exceptions in
Anglo-American law. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of
Touch and Concern, 1988 DUKE L.J. 925, 932 (1988) (analyzing the touch and concern
doctrine in covenant law for whether it “serves as a useful limitation on the parties’ ability
to create burdens that will bind nonparties”).
28. For a discussion of the public policy defense, see generally Stewart E. Sterk,
Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2
CARDOZO L. REV. 481 (1980).
29. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Back to the Future? How the Bill of Rights Might
Be About Structure After All, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 978 (1998) (discussing the
conventional wisdom regarding the rights/structure paradigm and Akhil Amar’s textual
and historical attack on it).
30. Compare 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 279 (2004) (stating that unconscionability is
found when “the inequality is so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and
confound the judgment of any person of common sense”), with 16B AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 970 (2009) (“Due process can serve as . . . a check on official
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capacious enough to include within them a great many more specific
rights.31 After developing the public/private “atomic arguments” in
the next Part, I will show that the model permits us to see these
doctrines as manifestations of the same underlying principle.
In addition to unifying private and public Constitutional Law, the
model illustrates a gap in our understanding of Constitutional Law
on the public side. Just as we have not fully appreciated the
Constitutional Law heritage embedded in the study of “contract law,”
we have under-appreciated how much of judicial practice and custom
on the public side is actually Constitutional Law. What governs a
court in evolving the common law if not some, often unstated, metarules concerning the manner in which it may do so? This, too, is
Constitutional Law: a common law, customary set of rules every bit
as important but far less scrutinized than the written edicts that
control the form and procedures of legislatures.
Although what constitutes valid legislation is defined by the
Presentment Clause and its state, local, and administrative
analogues,32 there is no written definition of legitimate, common-law
rulemaking or judicial interpretation. At least, there is no
centralized, easily digestible code for it. We have instead stare
decisis, fit and justification, rules about deciding no more than is
necessary, and a host of other informal doctrines, not to mention
academic study. The model points toward a much richer
understanding of the field of Constitutional Law than is usually
connoted by that label. This is only a preview, and I take up further
implications of the model for both Constitutional Law and Procedure
in Part IV.
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL CALCULUS
The model described in the last Part is, thus far, purely formal
and descriptive. It is a lens through which legal systems are revealed
as fundamentally ordered by choices between public and private
decisionmaking. There is immediate intuitive appeal to this
understanding, as it aligns nicely with the traditional categories that
misconduct which infringes on a fundamental right or as a limitation on official misconduct
which, although not infringing on a fundamental right, is so literally conscience-shocking,
and hence oppressive, as to rise to the level of a substantive due process violation.”).
31. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3030-36 (2010) (describing the
history of the Supreme Court’s use of the Due Process clause to incorporate many of the
right in the Bill of Rights against state governments).
32. Note here that the law governing the authority of administrative agencies to make
law is also Constitutional Law in my scheme. The Administrative Procedure Act and the
opinions interpreting it are an important part of this law. See generally Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2008). So too are state zoning enabling acts and other
“laws” that govern how subgroups within the collective can make laws.
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define legal education and practice. But the model is more than a
handsome portrait of the law. It represents a way to unify legal
analysis around basic, trans-substantive principles that take on
specific and familiar forms when applied to particular instances of
decisionmaking. This is so because the taxonomy renders legal
systems as divisions of control between the most elemental of
institutions: the public and the private.
This institutional description of legal systems converts what have
often been understood as substantive problems into questions of
institutional competency. Thus, it does for law as a whole what the
legal process scholars did for understanding the roles of agencies,
courts, and legislatures. Instead of asking what kinds of laws are
truly “criminal laws,” we can ask whether a given legal duty and
purpose is best enforced by public or private prosecutors and whether
its specification is best left to public or private lawmakers. We do this
not with an indeterminate, ontological inquiry into the true nature of
the law at issue, which I call the “historical-substantive” approach,
but with a comparison of the relative competencies of private entities
and public actors in carrying out that law’s project.
In Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, for example,
dissenting members of the Court reasoned that “criminal contempt,”
by virtue of its substance and traditional classification, is a “criminal
law” and that because of this fact it cannot be enforced by private
citizens.33 The taxonomy gives us an understanding of legal systems
that replaces this formalistic inquiry with a functional one. It
empowers us to ask directly whether private citizens can prosecute
such actions with the requisite competencies. Indeed, as I argue
below, the enforcement of some restraining orders, like the one in
Robertson, may be a power located in a public/private “zone of
twilight,” in which private parties should have concurrent power to
prosecute when public authorities choose not to do so.34
The institutional perspective also permits us to understand law in
terms of higher-level principles than does the traditional
“categorization by substance” approach. It frees us from the current
landscape of fragmented, subject-specific grants of and limitations on
power that are applicable only within seemingly sui generis legal
33. 130 S. Ct. 2184 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The Court dismissed certiorari
as improvidently granted. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Sotomayor, arguing that the Court should have reversed the Court of
Appeals and held, as a constitutional matter, that criminal contempt may not be
prosecuted by a private individual. Id. at 2190-91.
34. See infra Part IV.A. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
637 (1952) (holding that in the absence of positive congressional grants of authority or
prohibitions, the President operates within a “zone of twilight” in which congressional
inactivity might practically invite presidential action).
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categories. Instead, we can describe a more basic set of principles
that are generally stated but which take specific form after refraction
through the public/private lens. For example, the taxonomy allows us
to see that the doctrines of due process and unconscionability are
distinct images of a general principle reduced to the fields of public
and private lawmaking, respectively. Arguments built around these
general principles and the competencies of the institutions they
regulate are far more revelatory of our true concerns in lawmaking
than are special-purpose principles apparently disconnected from
other areas of law.
A. Uncovering the “Atomic Advantages”
In order to derive from the taxonomy the kinds of normative
results just discussed, I will first describe an institutional calculus.
This calculus comprises the basic tools we use in law to compare the
competencies of any two institutions. As such, its uses go well beyond
the mission of this Article. I will apply it here, however, only to compare
the public as an institution with private entities as institutions.
Rather than produce an exhaustive list of arguments deployed
when comparing institutions, I find it useful to identify core types of
comparators. From these core, or “atomic,” types, we can synthesize
more complex arguments. By focusing on the atoms, though, problems of
institutional choice can be reduced to more basic levels of analysis.
We can uncover atomic principles by tracing carefully what an
institution is asked to do in order to reach and effect a decision,
whether that decision be legislative, prosecutorial, adjudicative, or
some other kind. I contend that institutions, generally, are tasked
with taking account of the worth of decisional alternatives and
carrying out the preferred alternative.35 We can compare the relative
advantages of institutions by focusing on their abilities to make and
effect a decision. This involves taking account of information,
aggregating the information, and effecting the preferred choice.
Focusing individually on these decisional steps gives us the units of
our institutional analysis.36

35. This need not be a consequentialist exercise. An institution may be expected to
choose a result that will produce objectively “worse” consequences for the collective, but
that is somehow deemed, collectively, more worthy. Of course, collectives often will be
most concerned with whether an institution makes decisions that yield the most
desirable consequences.
36. In fact, these steps result in a decomposition of a general social welfare function,
focusing on estimation of its inputs and on its calculation. Because I assume the inclusion
of non-individualistic inputs and no particular form of calculation, the theory here is not
bound to consequentialism, welfare maximization, or any other normative theory.
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All decisions require inputs and the resources both to gather and
assess the inputs and to effect the decision. Beginning with the
inputs themselves, we can characterize them as either having to do
with the preferences of individual members of the collective or not.
To take proper account of individual-preference inputs, the
institution must be able to assess those preferences competently. I
call this “private calculation competency.”
If, in contrast, a decision depends on factors that are not reflected
in individuals’ preferences, then these factors must be related only to
the collective good. I call the capacity to estimate these nonindividualistic preferences “public calculation competency.”
Next, these inputs must be used somehow to evaluate
alternatives. They will need to be weighed, ordered, or otherwise
processed to reach a decision. I call the capacity to use the inputs
according to the will of the collective “public aggregation
competency.” This is the competency to take all of the inputs and
from them to evaluate the worth of a course of action that coheres
with the collective’s evaluation.
There is a kind of aggregative competency that is so often at issue
when comparing public and private decisionmakers that it is worth
considering separately. I will call “distributive competency” the
capacity of an institution to act as if it has as much concern for the
preferences of another individual as it does for its own members’. A
perfectly, distributively competent institution will not impose
unjustified external costs, because its members act as though they
have internalized the costs.37 No group, however, is perfect. But on
some questions an institution may act as if it is. The more the
consequences of a group’s actions are restricted to the group itself,
the more distributively competent that group is likely to be. But we
will return to what makes a group more distributively competent and
to the idea of relative competence below.
While the distributively perfect institution acts no differently than
it would if each detriment it imposed fell on its own members, this
does not mean that it aggregates preferences in a manner that treats
all equally. It only means that to the extent some preferences are
counted for less or not at all it is because the collective good
otherwise demands it, not because of the selfish motivations of the
institutions’ members.

37. I use the term “distributive” here to indicate that it is a measure of an institution’s
members’ ability to act as though they were in Rawls’ “original position,” that is as though
they were ignorant of their own positions in society and in particular whether and to what
extent they would be affected by the decisions they make. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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Finally, the ability actually to carry out the most worthy choice, I
call “resource competency.” Institutions might not only have differing
financial resources to marshal when effecting a decision, but they
may also possess qualitatively distinct powers for doing so. For
example, public laws can be made that have coercive effects on an
entire society, but private individuals generally must gain consent
through contract to bind others. The ability to coerce more cheaply is
an example of a distinct resource advantage.
With these atoms in hand, we can compare institutions by
assessing their relative competencies. When one institution is more
competent than another with respect to one of these atoms, we can
say that the institution has an advantage. And so, in sum, when
comparing institutions we inquire which has the relative (a) private
calculation advantage, (b) distributive advantage, (c) public calculation
advantage, (d) aggregation advantage, and (e) resource advantage.
Put differently: Are the decisionmaking candidates good at
estimating the decision’s impact on others, unselfish within the
context of the decision, able to assess collective and nonindividualistic values, able properly to aggregate the relative inputs,
and able to effect the decision? These are the atoms from which more
complex institutional arguments are made.
It is important to note at the outset that these atoms do not
inherently set out a deterministic arithmetic that will resolve in an
uncontested fashion the proper institution to decide any conceivable
issue. In a given legal dispute, we will not be able to measure each
atom under some universal metric and then without controversy
compare the resulting numbers to establish the proper choice.
Producing a complicated argument to tell all societies what must be
done is not the project of this Article.
Rather, the combination of reducing some important legal
decisions to a choice between public and private institutions and
identifying the basic components of institutional comparisons
(including those between the public and private individuals) will
yield a simplified account of legal choices across many seemingly
disparate fields of law. The atoms remind us of the variables to
analyze when comparing institutions, and they reduce complex
arguments to more basic disagreements. For example, comparisons of
complicated institutions can be simplified to questions of the proper
weighing of preferences and to empirical information concerning, say,
a decision’s impact on an individual. But the way a collective chooses
to balance a private actor’s slight distributive disadvantage against a
collective’s poor understanding of the actor’s preferences is a
normative decision. Different societies will choose to conduct such
balancing differently. What this periodic table of basic arguments
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does, however, is to reduce what appear to be complex, norm-bound,
public decisions to much more basic, but still norm-bound, choices.
B. Application to the Public and the Private
The atoms are basic units of analysis that can be used to compare
institutions. But they take on more specific meanings when restricted
to comparisons between public and private institutions. They also
possess certain default biases in favor of public and private control.
1. Private Calculation Advantage
Consider, first, private calculation competency. There is reason to
suspect that individuals themselves will usually have a private
calculation advantage over others, including the public.38 That is,
generally an individual is better than others at determining how
valuable something is to him or her.39 Where, however, some others
have a private calculation advantage over an individual, and where
we let the others’ calculation advantage control for that reason, we
have engaged in paternalism.40 We have substituted others’ judgment
concerning the worth of the thing to an individual for the individual’s
own judgment. Determining whether an individual or group of
individuals has a private calculation advantage over a public
institution is not always straightforward, as individual preferences
may be predictably or unpredictably mutable in time,41 dependent on
uncertain future events,42 and otherwise difficult to apprehend.43
38. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 77 (1921) (“Every person is
the final and absolute judge of his own welfare and interests.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does
“Unlawful” mean “Criminal”? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 225 (1991).
39. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 38, at 225 (suggesting there is a private calculation
advantage in an individual determining the costs and benefits of deviating from socially
desirable behaviors).
40. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J.
763, 763 (1983) (“In general, any legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground that it
would be contrary to the actor's own welfare is paternalistic.”). For an overview of the
proposals to restrict individual choice in the market and law-making process, see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165,
1177-1206 (2003) (arguing that cognitive errors may support constraints on the role of
individual choice). But see Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of
Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1624 (2006)
(questioning “the generality of the claim that short-run inefficiencies associated with
psychological biases justify paternalistic government regulations”).
41. For example, Carl Schneider describes the contextual dependence of private
preferences for condom use. See Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 411, 422-23 (2006). People may staunchly resolve to use condoms to avoid disease and
pregnancy. However, “such resolutions often break down in the ‘heat of the moment.’ ” Id.
at 423 (quoting George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting
Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85, 93
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999)). And the value of the resolution may skyrocket soon
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Furthermore, whether a calculation is “superior” depends on a
normative balance between cost and accuracy. Deeper reflection and
more study may lead to more accuracy but at an unacceptable cost.44
Logic will not resolve this balance, which is itself a matter of
preference. All we can say without controversy is that if an individual
can achieve a more accurate valuation at lower cost than others are
practically able to achieve, then the individual has the private
calculation advantage.
Where individuals are likely to be good evaluators without much
effort, they will typically have a private calculation advantage over
others. Where error costs are low for a broad range of error, again
individuals are likely to have the advantage, as they can usually
make decisions concerning their own tastes and circumstances more
cheaply than others. But for truly consequential decisions, where the
error costs are potentially significant enough that the costs of
evaluation necessary to reduce them become practical to bear, the
case for paternalism begins to come into focus.
2. Distributive Advantage
A reason often given to prefer public rather than private power
over a decision is that the private decision would be selfishly, but not
wrongly, calculated. In other words, people often, though not always,
care more about themselves than about others.45 While we can rely
on A to do what is best for A, if we want to reach a decision that is

after the “heat” has dissipated. Id. at 422 (“In brief, we struggle ineptly to predict our own
tastes, behavior, and emotions even over short periods and under familiar circumstances.
We make systematic mistakes in anticipating what we will enjoy. We regularly
‘miswant.’ ”); see also George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future
Utility, 1 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Econ., Working Paper No. E00-294, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=239901 (“Far more than suggesting
merely that people mispredict future tastes, this projection bias posits a systematic pattern in
these mispredictions which can lead to systematic errors in dynamic-choice environments.”).
42. See KNIGHT, supra note 38, at 4. (noting that past experience only “give[s] us
statements of what ‘tends’ to hold true or ‘would’ hold true under ‘ideal’ conditions”).
43. For an excellent set of examples demonstrating just how mistaken a judge of our
own preferences we can be, see Schneider, supra note 41, at 421–24.
44. While it is obvious that the cost of gathering information may exceed the marginal
benefit it provides to preference formation and decisionmaking, it is also true that
acquiring information can be costly in and of itself. See George Loewenstein & Ted
O’Donoghue, “We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way”: Negative Emotions, SelfRegulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 201 (2006) (noting that “information can
impose real costs, especially when it ultimately doesn’t change behavior”); see also
Christian Turner, The Burden of Knowledge, 43 GA. L. REV. 297 (2009).
45. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907,
920 (2004) (observing that a “mismatch between internalized and actual costs and benefits
skews a decisionmaker’s assessment of whether a given action is beneficial, and can lead to
inefficient choices about resource use”).
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best for the public at large, A may not be the one to do it. After all, he
might not take full account of the harm to B.
This is nothing more than a description of how an external cost, or
externality, can lead to socially inefficient behavior. It is a
stereotypical case for public regulation.46 For example, nuisance law
represents an effort to prevent individuals from imposing inefficient,
uncompensated costs on others’ use of property. Without it, a
polluting factory may selfishly decide to operate based only on the
costs and benefits to it, without regard for the harms it imposes on
neighbors—even if it knows what those harms are.
Externalities alone are not always justification for public
decisionmaking, however. The public is not automatically
distributively perfect, itself comprising agents whose decisions might
be disadvantaged compared to individuals or subgroups.47 For
example, democratic majorities, not to mention an autocratic dictator
like Rex,48 sometimes make decisions that place higher values on the
combined welfare of the decisionmakers and their constituents, while
discounting the welfare of outsiders.49 The entire theory of using
counter-majoritarian institutions to protect discrete and insular
minorities is premised on the existence of such public externalities.
3. Public Calculation Advantage
Just as private individuals are normally thought to be best
positioned to calculate their own preferences, we might suspect the
public is better positioned to calculate public preferences that are not
mere aggregations of private preferences. Although it is possible to
argue that any public preference must be some combination of the
preferences of those who compose the public, I leave this question
open.50 In any event, it may be more convenient to segregate
46. See, e.g., Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981) (explaining the interest in
regulatory techniques to protect consumers from inefficient buyer behavior). But see Paul
L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 12 (1986) (arguing that “regulators are not generally very good at distinguishing
efficient from inefficient behavior; they simply do not have the information necessary to
detect all flawed decisions”).
47. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1697, 1723 (1996) (“[T]he large size of the populations governed by state agencies means
that some individuals will have no incentive to protest laws that injure them slightly,
leading to attempts by interest groups to obtain redistributive laws.”).
48. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 151-54 (1980) (describing the heightened judicial review of laws burdening
minorities as a response to the lack of minority representation in the democratic process).
50. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy
Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. 281 (2001) (showing that a
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preferences that concern collective well-being from those private
preferences that are more selfish.
One example I will cite here, and to which I will refer briefly
below, is a public preference concerning obligations to future
generations that might conflict with the vast majority of individual
preferences that would discount such preferences.51 Such discounting,
in the face of a contrary public preference, would amount to intertemporal distributive disadvantage.
4. Aggregation Advantage
It is important to distinguish the more general aggregation
advantage from what I have called the distributive advantage. A has
a distributive disadvantage with respect to B if A selfishly gives
lesser weight to what A believes are B’s preferences than to his own
preferences. But even if A is unselfish, A may aggregate his and B’s
preferences, which are obviously two-fold, into a new, single
preference as to whether to go forward with an action in a different
manner than the collective would aggregate those preferences.
For example, if Rex rules the collective, A’s and B’s preferences
are irrelevant: only Rex’s preferences count in reaching a decision.
Another society might decide that for certain issues A’s preferences,
however strong, are of less importance than B’s and so should not be
weighed as heavily in resolving them. In each case, A’s calculation
differs from the public’s even though A perfectly calculated B’s
welfare and unselfishly weighed it (i.e., A possessed both private
calculation and distributive competency). This is what it means for A
to have an aggregation disadvantage.52
Calculating the aggregate public good requires knowledge of that
good and the ability to calculate its prerequisites. Rex the Tyrant
invariably has the aggregation advantage, as any consideration but
his own wants is immaterial. In contrast, a society that calculates the
good as some function of individual welfares faces a more complex
question. When an action affects only a few members, and hard
calculation of social welfare that is not solely some function of individual welfares will lead
to social choices that are inferior for every individual).
51. See, e.g., David Pearce et al., Valuing the Future: Recent Advances in Social
Discounting, 4 WORLD ECON. 121, 122 (2003) (“[W]e do discount future lives, both in terms
of our own lives, and the lives of people yet to come.”); Daniel A. Farber & Paul A.
Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the
Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267, 295 (1993) (citing empirical studies on discounting).
52. To give one other, somewhat trivial, example, even if A, B, and the public used the
same numerical method of evaluating individual welfares, A and B might measure their
joint gain by the sum of their individual gains, while the public might use another common
measure: the square root of the sum of the squares of their gains. This mathematical
difference will lead to different judgments concerning superior outcomes.
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choices about how to integrate their welfare gains and losses with the
rest of society’s are thus avoided, individuals will likely have an
aggregation advantage, at least when they have private calculation
advantage and distributive advantage. This is the case, for example,
with a sale of goods between two parties that carries no significant
externalities. In contrast, the more people who are affected by an
action, the less likely it is that we will be able to identify a subgroup
of the collective that has distributive and private calculation
advantages over the whole public. It is also less likely that the impact
of the many individual welfare changes on the public good will be
easy to measure.
5. Resource Advantage
The public as a whole often has, through taxation, better access to
the capital necessary to realize an action, and so the public often has
a resource advantage over its private constituents. This may not
always be the case, however. In practice, the resource question will
turn on the precise circumstances of the relevant public and private
entities.53 For example, whether public or private prosecutors are
best resourced to enforce publicly formulated safety regulations
depends on the total context of the society in which the regulations
exist. Are punitive damages available? Are private attorneys
permitted to keep a large share of any awards? Are there enough
potential actions to capitalize private prosecution firms? Is there an
existing and large enough network of public prosecutors, perhaps
with existing responsibilities in similar areas of enforcement, to take
advantage of economies of scale?54

53. See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729,
1735-36 (1993) (arguing that prosecutors have massive resource advantage over indigent
defendants at trial); L. Harold Levinson, The Public Law/Private Law Distinction in the
Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1579, 1582-85 (1989) (giving examples of civil and criminal
trials where either the plaintiff/prosecution or defendant has the resource advantage).
54. For an example in our own system of the possible inferiority of public resources to
enforce law, consider laws that provide for private attorneys general. Surveying the area,
Trevor Morrison identifies the major policy argument supporting such private attorneys:
[P]rivate attorneys general are depicted as a cost-effective means of
supplementing resource-constrained public enforcement. As Frederick
Schauer and Richard Pildes have observed in a related context, “[l]aw
whose effectiveness depends on constant monitoring and enforcement
by government officials will, absent massive commitment of public
resources, be far less effective than law that can enlist social norms or
private incentives to assist in enforcement.”
Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 589, 608 (2005) (quoting Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral
Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1831 (1999)).
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Even when access to capital is not an absolute constraint on
private action, understanding how entities will weigh potential costs
is not straightforward. Because of the declining marginal utility of
dollars, the same outlay of, say, cash will not be considered an equal
cost to two entities of radically different wealth. If we somehow knew
that an action (prosecution or law-making, for example) was socially
desirable, then we would want to put responsibility for the action on
the entity most likely to conduct it. Accomplishing the action is
assumed here to be a social good. Between two entities that would
realize roughly the same absolute benefits and be faced with the
same explicit resource outlays from the action, putting responsibility
on the wealthier entity would be justified as consonant with that
entity’s resource advantage over its poorer companion.
But resource advantage is broader than a wealth advantage. The
resources helpful to effect a decision include other rights and
capacities. For example, the ability to threaten another party with
damage, by withholding benefits or imposing punishment, is not
evenly distributed within the private sector or between the public
and private sector. An employer can coerce with the threat of
discharge. A business partner can coerce with the threat of
discontinuation of business. An enemy can coerce with the threat of
blows or other attacks. Accomplishing an action often requires the
cooperation of others, and public and private entities are rarely
equally situated in their ability to garner that cooperation.
A party has a resource advantage with respect to a decision over
another if it is better able to gain the necessary compliance of others
in the decision. Often, we might expect the public to possess this kind of
coercive advantage, as it has an important resource it normally denies
private parties: the ability to threaten violence for noncompliance.
Just as with capital, however, it is only a tendency, and even then
only for certain kinds of publics, that this kind of resource is more
abundant in the public sphere. A private entity surely could coerce
more successfully than the whole public in certain situations. To cite
but one example, in-laws in the backseat may be better positioned to
prevent speeding than the relatively remote risk of a speeding ticket.
More generally, when private parties can efficiently make
enforceable law between them, they can efficiently coerce each other.
Private parties suffer a comparative disadvantage to the public when
they cannot efficiently make enforceable law between them. Thus we
see that the inefficiencies typically lumped together as transaction costs
are a source of private resource disadvantage. As they become higher,
private parties are increasingly ill-equipped to coerce one another.
As a general matter, the public’s relative resource advantage is
often cited in arguments favoring public intervention.
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C. Compound Arguments
Before applying an institutional analysis to the taxonomy, it is
helpful to observe how a few well-known analytical tools decompose
into their atomic constituents and how direct analysis of those
constituents is helpful in better understanding the problems at hand.
I will assume from this point forward a collective that is concerned
primarily, though perhaps not exclusively, with the private welfare of
its members.55
1. Transaction Costs
A number of areas of public regulation have been justified as
replacing what would otherwise be very expensive private
contracting. For example, tort suits for auto accidents obviate the
need for individuals to contract ex ante with all other drivers to
allocate the risk of accidents.56 Since most people, the argument goes,
would contract for something like what the tort system provides,
namely agreements to pay for negligently caused damage, the public
authority’s imposing such terms saves the costs of contracting
without losing much of the benefit of private contracting.57 It is the
extreme resource advantage of the public authority, in the form of
coercive lawmaking capacity, where the individuals’ private
calculation disadvantage is modest (again, assuming we know
whether and how most people would contract for accident
compensation from negligent drivers) that makes this possible.
With the power to coerce comes the advantage of dictating terms.58
When one can dictate terms, one saves the cost of achieving
consensus with regard to lawmaking. While it would also be possible
to save the cost of consensus by somehow granting private parties the
power to coerce without the unanimous consent of those affected,
55. The taxonomy, of course, also captures the legal system of Rex the Tyrant, but
systems so far from our own are not my focus here.
56. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Torts—The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV.
519, 525 (1978); see also Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2
REV. L. & ECON. 137, 141 n.12 (2006) (noting that “coordination costs prevent parties from
meeting to bargain before [a traffic] accident occurs”).
57. I am not asserting that this argument is true, but a society might conclude that
for its people it is.
58. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471-73 (1923) (arguing that property law effectively provides the
coercive power that allows an owner to dictate the terms on which a non-owner can use or
consume the owner’s property); Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20
COLUM. L. REV. 451, 452 (1920) (characterizing contracts as creating legal rights and duties
“by virtue of the power of mutual coercion (in the form of pre-existing rights) vested by the
ordinary law in the two contracting parties” and noting that when one party holds rights
and privileges of superior strategic importance “the other party may in effect be compelled
to submit by contract to almost any terms imposed by the stronger party”).
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such parties are generally, though not always, at a severe
distributive disadvantage—meaning that they severely undervalue
the welfare of their adversaries—relative to the public at large.
Obviously, public decisionmaking carries costs, as private
decisionmaking might have other advantages that will now be lost.59
But where private parties’ private calculation advantages are
modest, their distributive disadvantage severe, and their costs of
obtaining mutual consent much higher than the cost of public
lawmaking (i.e., their resource disadvantage relative to the public
very high), we see that no atomic advantages significantly favor
private lawmaking. The resource advantage, however, heavily
favors public lawmaking. Therefore, in such situations, we should
expect to find, and do find, public lawmaking.60 If we see private
lawmaking, it should always be accompanied by innovations
intended to reduce transactions costs and thus the private parties’
resource disadvantage.
2. The Tragedy of the Commons
Garrett Hardin’s iconic story of the tragedy of the commons is
well-known.61 A cattleman in an open-access commons decides
whether to put an additional cow on the common pasture by
considering the benefits and costs to him of the marginal cow.
Because the benefits are internalized but the costs of the extra cow,
in the form of degraded rangeland, are spread over all the users, the
cattleman may graze the extra cow even though the total costs
imposed by the cow’s grazing exceed the cow’s benefits.62
Suppose this group of commons users had the means to cooperate
as a coherent public capable of mutual coercion. Should the decision
whether to put cows on the rangeland be made privately or should
there be regulation by this public? How should it make this decision?
First, there is little private calculation advantage favoring the
59. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 133-35 (1985) (discussing the
transaction costs of public decisionmaking regarding land use decisions).
60. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the move from Contract to
Tort for automobile accident compensation).
61. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
62. Id. at 1244. Hardin’s original description is beautifully concise:
[T]he rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him
to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and
another. . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd
without limit—in a world that is limited.
Id.
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cattlemen as individuals. Though they likely have cheapest access to
the information concerning the values to them of grazing additional
cows, these values are not especially idiosyncratic. A disinterested
observer could probably calculate the private benefit of grazing an
additional cow nearly as well as the cattleman himself. Note that this
also means that each cattleman is probably not a bad calculator of
the value of grazing to the other cattlemen. So neither the public nor
the individual cattlemen appear to have any significant private
calculation advantage.
It is similarly doubtful that the cattlemen have any advantage, or
disadvantage, in public calculation or aggregation. In an economic
commons, if we restrict attention to exploitation, there is probably
not much disagreement about the total benefits to all users or that
that total is a sum of private benefits.
Where the individual cattlemen lose out is in their extreme
distributive disadvantage. Hardin’s famous example would not occur
if each cattleman felt the damage done to fellow commons users as
strongly as damage done to himself. In that case, there would be no
true externality. But a tragedy of the commons occurs when users
discount the happiness of others. Although one of our cattlemen is
not at a particular disadvantage in estimating the harm to his peers
caused by grazing one more cow, he values that harm less than he
would if it were his own.63 This distributive disadvantage will lead to
inefficient private choices, and in the case of an open access
commons, a cascade of inefficient choices.
Further, the private users will have difficulty combining to form
an advantaged private entity. In more familiar terms, the users will
have a difficult time contracting, as in the prior example. Here, this
difficulty arises because they cannot effectively keep out new users,
with whom they must also contract. As the number of potential users
increases, private contracting becomes more expensive and therefore
less attainable. The public often has a decided resource advantage
here, as it can more easily dictate terms that apply to large numbers
of users and potential users.64
63. Hardin describes the cattleman’s distributive disadvantage in terms of his selfish
calculation of the marginal utility of adding a cow. Id. The cattleman asks, “ ‘What is the
utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?’ ” Id. In doing so, he discounts
completely the damage to his peers.
64. The point is not that open access commons will never be susceptible to private
ordering. Rather, inherent in such commons are these problematic tendencies. Private
ordering may effectively avert the tragedy when private entities are comparably resourced
to public entities with respect to creating coercion sufficient to overcome their individual
distributive disadvantages. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 237-39 (1991) (arguing that close-knit groups “have[] both
continuing reciprocal power over one another and also a bank of shared information,”
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Using the atomic advantages, we can predict situations in which
the tragedy of the commons will not so obviously point toward public
regulation: namely, and contrary to Hardin’s hypothetical scenario,
when the individual users do have a significant private calculation
advantage. It becomes even more difficult, politically, when there are
public preferences distinct from and possibly in competition with the
private preferences of the commons users. This is so because there is
likely to be internal disagreement about how to measure such public
values and how to aggregate them with the users’ preferences.
Indeed, the more difficult commons problems arise where: (a) the
benefits derived from the commons are highly idiosyncratic and
difficult to estimate, so that the public is at a large private
calculation disadvantage even as it is advantaged in other
dimensions and (b) where the social good of the commons is highly
divergent from the good as understood by many commons users,
putting private entities at a likely public calculation disadvantage,
predictably resulting in political friction.
The market in pollutants that contribute to climate change comes
to mind as just such an example, owing to the diversity of uses that
occasion such pollutants and the degree to which those activities are
psychologically distant from the ultimately tragic consequences.65
Here, users’ preferences are not well correlated with collective
concerns, which may seem distant, resulting in predictable fighting
over the true weight of those concerns and over how to weigh them
against the much more readily apparent private benefits of use.
Taxation seems like it would solve both problems, by internalizing
the social cost without displacing private cost-benefit calculations. In
attributes that reduce resource disadvantage relative to public enforcement mechanisms).
In addition to his own research on the ranchers of Shasta County, Ellickson cites James
Acheson’s pathbreaking work on informal social ordering among Maine lobstermen. Id. at
238 n.23. Acheson observes that between the three extremes of unregulated individual
exploitation of an open access commons, a fully propertized commons, and a fully regulated
commons lie “communal property arrangements,” meaning control by a nongovernmental
collection of individuals. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 143 (1988);
See also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 182-91 (1990) (summarizing empirical studies and their relationships
to game-theoretic models concerning open access commons and establishing that under
many assumptions private ordering will avert tragic misuse). Notably, to the extent private
ordering responds to a tragedy of the commons, it results from a sub-society with its own,
internal legal system, which itself is subject to the taxonomy advanced here. Private
individuals form a “public” when they organize, even if imperfectly, their mutual coercive
power. I leave the problem of pluralism, the view of society as a grand collage of sometimes
hierarchical and sometimes parallel legal systems, for another work.
65. Another example that has been suggested to me is the market in health care. At
the heart of both of these complex social problems lie basic decisions concerning public and
private control that require an analysis of the competencies of the public and private as
institutions. Understanding the problems this way helps to clear much of the fog from what
our most basic disagreements actually concern.
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other words, it might preserve private calculation advantage while
solving the private party’s failure to internalize public preferences.
By focusing on the atomic advantages that are behind the tragedy,
we can better appreciate the types of open-access problems that are
likely to be contentious and where users are likely to resist
collectivizing solutions.
3. Principal-Agent Problems
As a third example, take principal-agent problems, which arise in
most forms of public decisionmaking and in corporations.66 These
problems come in at least two flavors: the problem of disloyal agents
and the problem of misguided but loyal agents. Loyal agents may fail
because of calculation disadvantages. Though they are tasked with
representing a principal, perhaps a government official representing
the public, they miscalculate the principal’s wants. Whether it is a
private preference or public norm that is miscalculated depends on
whether the principal is private or public, respectively. Disloyal
agents, by contrast, may or may not properly calculate the principal’s
preferences, but they are distributively impaired. They act at least in
part on account of their own preferences in derogation of the
principal’s.67 For this reason, the problem of disloyal agents is often
an instance of an arrangement with distributive disadvantage.
Most arguments concerning public and private competency can be
translated to a composition of the elements I have identified here.
For example, the public owes its advantage in eliminating
transaction costs, where it exists, to its resource advantage combined
with minimal or nonexistent calculation and distributive
disadvantages. The tragedy of the commons presents a case of
private distributive disadvantage combined with resource
disadvantage. Agency problems result from either distributive
disadvantage or calculation disadvantage.
With the tools in hand to analyze choices between public and
private institutions, we can proceed to analyze legal systems as
primarily ordered by basic institutional choices. These atoms will
help us to understand the range of arguments concerning the
66. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976),
reprinted in 3 LAW AND ECONOMICS: OTHER AREAS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAW 107, 111
(Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 1997) (noting that the principal-agent problem
“exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every level of management in
firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities
and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such
as are common in the performing arts and the market for real estate”) (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 110 (“If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good
reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.”).
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classification of law within the resulting taxonomy and the
regulation of and within the categories themselves.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In Part II, I developed a taxonomy of legal systems constructed
around discrete divisions of institutional control between the public
and private actors. Part III established a language of institutional
comparison that can be used to evaluate relative public and private
competencies with respect to the basic decisions—lawmaking and
enforcement—that underlie legal systems. By changing focus from
historical-substantive definitions of legal subjects to functional,
institutional ones, the taxonomy makes possible a great many
innovations in our study of legal systems. It exposes the relevance of
the techniques of the legal process school, and its descendants, for the
entirety of legal structure, not just inter-governmental comparisons.
In this Part, I begin to explore some of these implications. In
particular, there are three types of advancements that I wish to
highlight. First, the taxonomy suggests basic principles, or transsubstantive rules, that take on their familiar forms when refracted
through the lens of a particular taxonomic category. An example to
which I have already alluded, and which I will elaborate below, is the
connection between due process and unconscionability, which are
particularized expressions of a more basic principle of institutional
competency in Constitutional Law. I believe that such basic
principles provide a more sensible way to understand our own
Constitution and that our focus on particular provisions applicable to
historical-substantive, rather than functional, categories has resulted
in unnecessary confusion.
The taxonomic categories developed here are highly correlated but
not perfectly co-extensive with our law’s historical-substantive
categories. Where there is imperfect overlap, there is an opportunity
to observe whether the colloquial, substantively defined categories of
our law have led us astray. After all, to the extent these categories
depart from those of the taxonomy, the categorization is no longer
serving the functional purposes discussed here and elides
institutional differences between the public and the private. It should
therefore come as no surprise that laws in this gap come into tension
with a functional understanding of what our law should do. Tort suits
for punitive damages and private actions to enforce “criminal” laws
are two examples I will explore to illustrate this.
Second, the taxonomy highlights areas of our law that might
otherwise seem ad hoc or sui generis. For example, the model
explains why the law of charitable trusts appears primarily in the
Parens Patriae category. When our legal system is viewed as a
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collection of historical-substantive categories, it seems a special case
that the state attorney general enforces charitable gifts. The
institutional model, however, explains why this is so and gives
this area of law a structural role related to the other, more
populated categories. The logical, structural map of the taxonomy
serves as a reminder of the multitude of options available to us in
crafting a legal system.
Finally, the model (a) makes transparent the relevant objects of
study within legal systems and the modes of that study and (b)
simultaneously exposes the relation between the scholarship of
different fields. The taxonomy renders obvious the sorts of questions
one would ask and the analysis one would use to compare, for
example, property rules and liability rules or criminal law and tort.
While the discussion of the first two implications goes a long way
toward demonstrating this, I close with a further suggestion of the
integrative possibilities of the public/private model. Calabresi and
Melamed’s distinction between property rules and liability rules is in
fact a structural distinction between public and private control over
remedies. This suggests a possible third dimension of our taxonomy,
which I begin to explore. The unification of these concepts with the
institutional calculus demonstrates further that formerly disparate
areas of study can be unified as different applications of the same
basic principles.
A. Trans-substantive Principles and Constitutional Law
The first major implication of the taxonomic method, and the one
to which I will devote the most attention here, is the symmetry it
exposes between the secondary rules (Constitutional Law and
Procedure) of the various legal subjects. If these subjects differ
primarily in their choices of institutional actors, then so too should
their secondary rules chiefly reflect the differences among these
choices. My claim in this section is that there are general principles,
independent of any of the specific categories, that translate into
specific secondary rules when applied within the categories.
The two principles I develop here are: (1) an ex ante requirement
that institutions be designed and their scope of authority crafted to
realize atomic competency and (2) an ex post principle invalidating
decisions that manifest extreme atomic disadvantage, i.e. poor
institutional fit. The first principle guides the choosing and design of
decisionmaking institutions in order to capture the usual advantages
and mitigate the usual disadvantages of the institution’s type (public
or private). The second principle examines an institution’s decisional
output for manifest disadvantage despite the ex ante appropriateness
of the institution for the kind of decision reached. In the remainder of
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this section, I will examine these principles in the context of
Constitutional Law. In the next section, I will apply these two
principles to Procedure to derive secondary rules concerning
Criminal Law and Tort.
1. The First Principle: Institutional Selection (Structure)
Perhaps the most basic thing a legal system must do is to
determine who will make its laws. Most systems will allow for a
diversity of lawmaking bodies, with secondary rules that describe the
necessary fit between the type of law made and lawmaking
institution. I am concerned here with how legal systems determine,
ex ante, whether an institution will be permitted to make laws of a
given type. Such a principle is, again, one of fit. As such, it can be
examined in two ways: (a) as a constraint on the kinds of law a
particular institution is entitled to make or, equivalently, (b) as
governing the attributes of institutions that make a particular law.
To put it differently, it does not matter whether we conceive of this ex
ante constraint on lawmaking as selecting the proper sort of laws for
a given institution or the proper institutional form for a given law.
They amount to the same inquiry.
The first principle, restricted to Constitutional Law, states that
lawmaking institutions must possess the atomic competencies as
lawmakers. This principle implies constraints on institutional design
and on the scope of lawmaking authority. While an institution might
be competent to make certain laws, it might be predictably
incompetent at making other laws. In particular, public and private
entities have stereotypical advantages and disadvantages, and
lawmaking authority should be assigned in such a way as to
control the stereotypical disadvantages while capturing the
benefits of the advantages.
2. Privately Made Law
Given that public actions are consciously the work of the
collective, one can argue for a sort of natural primacy of private
control that relies not on any anthropological or psychological
evidence, but on logic: “While private persons are agents in nature,
the public has no natural manner of acting. . . . That is why private
agency is the presumptive and residual category, public agency the
one that has to be established.”68 While it is possible to establish
suffocatingly intrusive and powerful public agency, a collective must
affirmatively decide that it will do so.
68. Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus, The Public and the Private: Concepts and Action,
in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 16 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus, eds., 1983).
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We therefore generally default to private lawmaking (and to
private enforcement) except in those situations in which the atomic
advantages clearly favor public institutions.69 In other words, we will
prefer to allow the individuals within the collective to govern themselves
when possible. The problem is that private lawmakers, again
stereotypically, are disadvantaged in each atom save private calculation.
At a minimum, the first principle requires that lawmakers be
selected so that they are relatively distributively competent. No
institutions composed of humans will completely slip the bonds of
selfishness, but we do not require perfection here. Private lawmakers
should be empowered at least when they do not suffer distributive
disadvantage relative to public lawmakers. A single individual with
authority to make laws of his own choosing that bind others would
very likely not make laws consistent with the public good. This
individual will probably discount the preferences of others and
aggrandize his or her own. The way to eliminate this disadvantage is
to limit the lawmaker’s scope of authority to those laws as to which
others are indifferent, so that their preferences would be
inconsequential even if the individual considering them were
distributively perfect.
If a law would regulate the conduct only of those who agree to be
bound by it, then enactment by these individuals will not suffer from
significant distributive disadvantage. For this reason, the presence of
consent among all those who could be coerced under a law is the primary
constitutional identification-principle within private lawmaking.
If a private law has the consent of all those who will be regulated,
meaning those subject to coercion after adjudication, then we
conclude that the set of private citizens making the law has together
calculated and fully valued all of the individual welfare effects of the
law.70 After all, if a properly calculating person does not prefer a law,
he or she will not consent to it. Collectively, this private group has no
distributive disadvantage compared to any larger set of individuals
or the whole public, even though the group’s members may be
69. The point of this section’s assumption is that the occasions are rare and therefore
special, in such societies, when a distributively perfect and well-calculating group of
individuals reaches a decision contrary to the public’s will. Thus, well-calculating private
individuals are usually at no public calculation or aggregation disadvantage. Since the
relevant inputs in such situations often concern only the parties themselves, the parties’
aggregation is usually preferable to those of any public agent.
70. It is possible, of course, that a private law may impose externalities on others who
are not directly regulated by it. Reaching this conclusion requires us to scrutinize the law’s
content. Where a particular private law’s content makes us highly suspicious that the
atomic advantages, such as distributive advantage, are lacking despite the apparent
consent of affected parties, we resort to the second principle, manifesting in Contract as the
doctrine of unconscionability or a finding that the contract violates public policy.
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individually selfish, because no other individuals will be bound to
follow any provisions of the private law.
Insisting on consent among the group regulated by a private law
also provides some assurance that the group possesses the other
atomic competencies. If a society is normally concerned with
maximizing private welfare, or at the very least approves of legal
changes that are Pareto efficient (in a broader welfare, rather than
wealth, sense), then consent among affected parties ought generally
to satisfy us that the private group has sufficiently aggregated
preferences,71 since the public, too, would prefer a law that improved
the lot of some private parties without negatively affecting others. To
the extent a particular private law does not have this property but,
instead, greatly harms private or collective interests, as to which
private lawmakers do suffer both distributive and public calculation
disadvantage, respectively, our second principle can be used to justify
its invalidation. I will return to this below, but for now, and
restricting attention to societies similar to our own, we can conclude
that true consent to be bound among all those regulated will usually
reflect an act of lawmaking that is not disadvantaged with respect
to any atom relative to a public determination of the worth of the
same law.
Thus, within Contract, the first principle will blossom into
doctrines meant to guarantee consent among regulated parties.
These doctrines are the structural rules of the Constitutional Law of
Contracts. One method for ensuring consent is to require that private
laws be accompanied by evidence of agreement by the affected
parties, each of whom possesses private calculation advantage. From
this follow the doctrines of offer and acceptance, competence to
contract, the parole evidence rule, the statute of frauds, and more.
They are, most importantly, a natural consequence of the
institutional method the model illuminates. These doctrines
measure, through consent, the atomic competencies of a private
group to pass laws that will bind its members.
The strength and quality of the evidence of agreement necessary
to recognize enactment of a private law, naturally, ought to be
conditioned on the prevailing social circumstances with respect to the
type of agreement at issue. How commonly, for a given sort of
agreement, do people tend to claim agreement when there is none,
whether fraudulently or out of confusion? What are the potential

71. Of course, “[l]eadership, charisma, and feelings of deference may give the
preferences of one individual more weight in the process than the preferences of others.”
Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L.
REV. 561, 598-99 (1977).
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consequences if this sort of private law is made by atomically
incompetent private entities?
If we insist on more or better evidence of consent, we are asking in
effect for more elaborate lawmaking procedures. The goal of
structural Constitutional rules is to ensure institutional competency,
which reduces in Contract Law to ensuring consent among regulated
parties. For some types of contracts, realizing this goal requires more
procedure and perhaps even the observance of stricter institutional
forms before recognizing “enactment.” The Statute of Frauds is an
example of a structural requirement that selects certain laws for the
heightened procedure of written, rather than oral, enactment.
Thought to be unusually prone to fraud and coercion,72 wills have
even more elaborate enactment procedures aimed at measuring
atomic competency, including a more elaborate institutional
structure that requires the participation of witnesses (disinterested
lawmakers who will not be regulated by the private law).
In contrast, the law of gifts requires only weak evidence of
consent.73 The making of a gift, as a private law transferring
property, must still satisfy our first principle and thus must still be
accompanied by the consent of the regulated parties. In the law of
gifts, this consent is formally known as “acceptance” by the donee.74
Consent here serves the same purpose it does in other contracts:
measuring agreement and thereby avoiding a distributively flawed
and poorly calculating private law transferring the gift. But with
respect to gifts, we generally require no affirmative evidence of
acceptance. For gifts of objective value, courts presume acceptance.
This is only a presumption, and so evidence of lack of a donee’s
consent will defeat a gift. But we assume that nearly everyone
would accept a gift, meaning consent to a law transferring it to
them, when the gift is valuable. Thus, insisting on more elaborate
structure (procedures evidencing consent) is not worth its costs in
this area of law.
The model suggests that to the extent the various forms of
Contract Law insist on differing levels of proof of agreement, those
differences should reflect the levels of skepticism the public has
concerning the voluntary nature of the private group making the
kind of law at issue. This is because voluntarism ensures, at least

72. See generally Ralph W. Gifford, Will or No Will? The Effect of Fraud and Undue
Influence on Testamentary Instruments, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 862 (1920).
73. For an overview, see generally Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the
Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567 (1997).
74. Consent on the part of the donor is measured by an element requiring that the
donor had an intent to make a gift and delivered that gift.
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from an ex ante, structural perspective, the relative atomic
competence of the private entity to make law.
There is at least one area of Contract Law, though, where we
again require more evidence to satisfy the first principle, but not
evidence of voluntarism. Covenants that run with the land,
essentially contracts that will bind successors in interest of real
property who themselves were not party to the contract, require more
than consent to become binding private law against such successors.
Most of this evidence can be created by the original contracting
parties, but the requirement that the agreement “touch and concern”
the land is not an element that can be created by parties, no matter
how desirous of creating a covenant that runs.75
With respect to this kind of contract, we see that the original
contracting parties are not the only ones who will be regulated by the
agreement. Therefore, consent between them, while important, is
insufficient to satisfy the first principle. Indeed, those who will be
regulated may not even be born at the time of the agreement. The
original contracting parties thus have both distributive
disadvantages and possibly public calculation disadvantages, to the
extent they discount the welfare of future generations more than the
public otherwise would.
The requirement that the agreement touch and concern the land
attempts to ensure against these incompetencies by detecting
whether, on average, these consenting parties are good agents for the
future landowners who would be regulated. That is, does the selfinterest of the parties probably align with that of future landowners?
If the contract relates to the parties’ use of land, then perhaps, on
balance and on average, the answer is yes.
This brief tour demonstrates how the simple, abstract first principle
can explain the diversity of private law procedures and forms, once we
understand the problem to be one of institutional competency.
3. Publicly Made Laws
Public lawmaking, the kind “that has to be established,”76 yields
Tort and Criminal Law. It is appropriate where private lawmaking is
insufficient to meet societal goals and where the public lawmaking
institutions possess the requisite atomic competencies. We should
remember that these categories are not exclusive with respect to
legal goals. That is, we can and do use Contracts, Tort, and Criminal
Law to regulate the same activities. Access to private property, for
75. Stake, supra note 27, at 943-48.
76. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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example, is governed by contracts, by trespass torts and by criminal
trespass statutes. An intentional killing is both a breach of criminal
statutes and a wrongful death tort. The basic principles can,
however, help us to determine when an institutional configuration (a
box in the model) should be the exclusive means to achieve a goal and
when a configuration should be disallowed.
When applied to public lawmaking the first principle (ex ante,
structural competency) results in a number of doctrines intended to
ensure institutional form and methods of enactment that will result
in atomically competent decisionmaking. Accomplishing this in the
field of private lawmaking leads inevitably to the identification of
consent among regulated parties as the linchpin of the requisite
structural Constitutional Law. But public lawmaking seeks to solve
social problems where such consent is not readily achievable, often
because the costs of doing so, for example through mass contracting,
are insurmountable. Public institutions must necessarily be freed
from the demand the first principle places on private lawmakers that
all regulated parties consent to any law.
Of course, the individual actors who make public laws are just as
susceptible to distributive incompetency as private lawmakers, and
they are just as prone to omitting collective, non-individualistic
preferences when making decisions. Further, because they make law
that will bind others without others’ consent, we cannot be sure that
the lawmakers have even measured individual preferences properly.
Without consent, what does the first principle demand?
Lawmaking institutions are incredibly diverse, including
traditional legislatures, local government bodies, administrative
agencies, common law courts, and citizen electorates. It is obviously
beyond the scope of this Article to trace the principle’s specific
action on every possible lawmaking structure, but I do have some
initial thoughts.
The primary public Constitutional Law resulting from the first
principle consists of (a) the affirmative structural requirements
defining and granting powers to institutions and (b) procedural due
process as a tool with which other public institutions can measure, ex
ante and without reference to the lawmaking output of the
institution, the success of these definitional provisions. With respect
to the former, a study of lawmaking process rules as a cohesive whole
has only just begun.
Adrian Vermeule is one of the relatively few that has tried to
connect basic principles of institutional competency with the
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procedural rules of a lawmaking institution.77 His attention was
restricted to Congress and to some of the rules in our Constitution
that define Congress and its methods.78 But the larger project was “to
examine this body of rules as a unified topic that is central to the
constitutional design of legislative institutions.”79
Vermeule’s method is similar to the one I advocate here: He
identified “widely shared criteria”80 of success in institutional design
and then used them to analyze the various procedural rules. The
criteria he identified are nearly isomorphic to the atoms.81 With
these, Vermeule surveyed various constitutional provisions
concerning congressional procedure and analyzed them for, among
other things, their tendency to prevent aggrandizing institutional
acts, which he describes as opening the door to self-dealing (i.e.
distributive failure), and to ensure enough participation in
deliberation to ensure informed consideration (i.e. calculation
competency). His is an instructive primer on the use of quorum rules,
super-majority voting, open meetings, and the like to make the
competency of the lawmaking body more likely.
Congress, of course, is not our only lawmaking body, and the
structural rules necessary to ensure its competency are not likely to
be identical to those needed for other bodies that have different
missions and less visibility. Administrative agencies are established
by the Administrative Procedure Act, their organic statutes, and
court rulings. Subject to the outsized influence of interested parties,
agencies are often required to go through procedures such as notice
and comment before making law, an effort to ensure distributive
advantage (securing against agency aggrandizement) and
aggregative competency (securing against capture). Local land use
planning is governed by state zoning enabling acts, often with special
procedures to promote competency despite the nonprofessional and
often conflicted composition of city and county commissions. Whether
77. See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361 (2004).
78. See id.
79. Id. at 363.
80. Id. at 380.
81. See id. at 381-82. Vermeule’s criteria are (1) minimization of principal-agent
problems, (2) encouragement of “well-informed and cognitively undistorted deliberation,”
and (3) efficient use of legislative resources. Id. The first principle is another way, as we
have seen, of analyzing the distributive competency. See id. at 381. The second measures,
though lumping them together, the private and public calculation competencies. See id.
The third measures the resource competency of an institution. See id. at 382-83. Perhaps
because he did not focus on questions of structure and composition, id. at 362, Vermeule’s
principles do not obviously measure aggregative competency. But in representative bodies,
it is often assumed that if the representation is “fair,” a question of structure and
composition, a well-calculating and distributively competent body will aggregate in a way
that is by definition in the public interest. See id.
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judges are elected or appointed, for how long, and how their ruling
are reviewed are variables that ought to be informed by the demands
of the first principle.
The law of procedural due process is intended to review
decisionmaking bodies themselves for adequate structure in light of an
alleged harm. Courts use this secondary rule to examine a lawmaking
institution for adequate procedure and form under the circumstances.82
With this understanding, it should be clear that procedural due
process analysis is the twin of the consent principle in private
lawmaking. Each is an ex ante measure of a lawmaking institution’s
structure for atomic competency. Once we recognize these doctrines’
symmetric roles, we appreciate that Contract Law is shot through
with its own version of procedural due process.83 There, the
requirement of consent generated structural requirements that
varied with our level of concern that, in a given area, voluntarism
might be absent. In public law, procedural due process demands
different levels of proof of lawmaker competency depending on the risk
of otherwise uncorrectable incompetency in a given lawmaking area.
For formal, top-level legislatures, there is essentially no
procedural due process review, not because the first principle plays
no role, but because it is automatically satisfied by rule-like
constitutional form and procedural commands. Many lower-level
legislative bodies, however, do find themselves subject to procedural
due process review. And just as with the measurement of consent,
the degree of evidence required to demonstrate competency,
satisfying the first principle, varies depending on experience-based
estimates of the frequency with which a given type of institution
administering a particular kind of law will lack atomic competencies.
For example, in administrative law, agency lawmaking that can
be characterized as “adjudication,” basically laws that apply to
deprive “[a] relatively small number of persons” of important
interests, are subject to more stringent ex ante procedural
requirements.84 Agency actions that work similar deprivations on
broader classes are more likely to be deemed legislative and to be
subject to lesser procedure.85 The first principle applies in the same
82. See Wallace Mendelson, A Missing Link in the Evolution of Due Process, 10 VAND.
L. REV. 125, 135 (1956).
83. Those who have advocated for a new role for procedural due process in private law
have, therefore, actually been arguing for greater levels of competency proof, not so much
for a qualitatively different set of private secondary rules. See, e.g., F. Eric Fryar, Note,
Common-Law Due Process Rights in the Law of Contracts, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1021, 1026
(1988) (“Unlike lawmaking and substantive limits, however, due process limits play a
relatively minor role in regulating contractual self-government.”).
84. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915).
85. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 737-44 (5th ed. 2010).
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way in local government law.86 Just as we measure for consent as a
proxy for calculation and distributive competency in private law,
broadly targeted laws are more likely to visible among the public
agents’ constituents, and so we worry less that they are severely
miscalculating the preferences of the affected parties or that they are
self-dealing, i.e. distributively incompetent.
4. The Second Principle: Manifest Ill-Fit (Rights)
An ongoing and central debate in our contract law concerns the
extent to which the sovereign, whether through legislatures or
courts, should impose public norms of fairness on private
agreements. In other words, how deeply should the substantive
constraints on private lawmaking go? A homomorphic debate rages
within public law, from the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,87 to the
Court in Lawrence v. Texas,88 to the dissenters in Kelo v. City of New
London.89 Each of these opinions represents an effort to use
Constitutional Law to find implied substantive constraints on what
another lawmaker within the system is able to do.
The second principle grounds this objective in an examination of
an institution’s decisional output for evidence of aberrantly poor fit,
i.e. unusual atomic disadvantages. A legislature may be defined by
rules intended to select its members, guide its functions, and vest it
with authority in a manner to preserve atomic competencies. That is,
the legislature is governed by Constitutional Law derived from the
first principle. And yet, it may nonetheless engage in self-dealing or
act contrary to the will of the public. The second principle is meant to
detect these failings.
Under the second principle, when a law manifests the significant
lack of atomic competencies it will be declared invalid. So contracts
manifesting unusually poor private calculations or tort or criminal
laws demonstrating peculiarly poor public calculations or unusually
bad distributive consequences will, at some point along the spectrum,
be deemed to go too far and will not be enforced. In other words,
manifest institutional failure will be the basic criterion of invalidity.90

86. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993) (distinguishing
rezonings that affect large numbers of people from those affecting smaller numbers and
singling out the latter for additional required process).
87. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
88. 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
89. 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Again, I make no presumption concerning the public norms that actually do the
measuring of such laws. Rex finds no failure in his changing and harsh whims, as the absence
of any consideration of the preferences of others is not a defect of laws within his system.
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On the public side, let us assume for a moment a basically
utilitarian regime that is publicly concerned with aggregating
preferences in some way deemed to be distributively fair over time.
When lawmakers exhibit manifest distributive unfairness, the
distributive advantage of public lawmaking is apparently absent, and
with it the very justification for public, rather than private, power.
Public laws are misplaced when they represent private redistributive
efforts rather than public ones. We instead should resort to private
law, with its requirement of consent.
In his concurrence in Kelo v. City of New London, Justice Kennedy
highlighted this potential danger and noted that some government
takings might be attended by facts so suggestive of impermissible
private purposes that courts should engage in heightened scrutiny.91
Redistribution for private purposes should be conducted privately,
adopted under the procedures for, and restrictions on, making
private law (typically including consent of all those whose resources
would be substantially reallocated). In our system, preventing
majorities from running roughshod over minorities, meaning protecting
against majoritarian governance that utterly lacks true, distributive
advantage, is the backbone of all the substantive Constitutional rights,
whether explicit or a task of the Due Process clause.92
On the private side, we are concerned with situations in which the
lawmaking is plainly indicative of a failure to have private
calculation advantage or of a serious, uncontrolled distributive
disadvantage. These problems are solved doctrinally in the first
instance by requiring voluntarism, so that generally, no one is
coerced by private law who did not agree to be. But whether there
was a truly voluntary agreement is sometimes difficult to say.
Unconscionability is the doctrine that scrutinizes private
lawmaking for too dramatic a failure of private calculation. This
doctrine has procedural and substantive prongs.93 Substantively, we
are trying to see whether a contract was such a bad deal that no one

91. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“There may be private transfers in
which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a
presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use
Clause.”). Justice Kennedy concluded that the mere fact that private parties ultimately
receive benefits, even direct benefits, from a taking is not enough to trigger such
heightened scrutiny. Id.
92. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also ELY,
supra note 49, at 181 (suggesting that the judiciary “can appropriately concern itself only
with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice
under attack”).
93. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
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could truly have agreed to it.94 When there is a manifest, privatecalculation failure, there is, in a sense, no true agreement.95 Courts
are generally reluctant to assert such a thing, as, after all, the
parties did in fact agree to the contract, at least formally. Thus,
courts often require a finding of some amount of what they call
“procedural unconscionability,”96 which is simply some evidence from
the act of lawmaking itself that the parties did not voluntarily enter
the arrangement.97 It is only together that the promisor and promisee
have a distributive advantage and private calculation advantage
between them. If one made the law for both, without consent, that
law would obviously lack these advantages. Unconscionability aims
to spot such situations lurking behind apparent consent.98
Consider the obvious example of slavery laws. Public slavery laws
fail the basic test of public lawmaking capacity because their very
substance is indicative of an extreme failure in distributive
competency. A legislature that orders the enslavement of some is
plainly not taking into account the enslaved group’s interests. A
private contract to enter into slavery is likewise problematic. It is
indicative of a failure of the advantages that justify resort to Contract in
the first place, namely private calculation advantage. Where these
advantages are so manifestly lacking, the Constitutional Law of
Contract, Tort, or Criminal Law will be used to invalidate a law.
The above is only a sketch of the model’s utility in uncovering
inherent similarities and necessary differences between particular
kinds of public and private Constitutional Law. The institutional
perspective reveals that many aspects of the particular secondary
94. For a contrary view, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability
Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 205, 235 (2000) (asserting that
unconscionability is grounded not in paternalism but in the state’s obligation “not to assist
grossly unfair treatment” even where there is true consent). Shiffrin’s view would find
unconscionability in areas where the parties are at a severe public calculation advantage.
This view carries with it the argument that, at least in some areas, the public should have
substantive norms that are unconnected to the satisfaction of private preferences, even
when there are no private distributive consequences.
95. Private calculation failure is the most common justification for the doctrine. See
Horacio Spector, A Contractarian Approach to Unconscionability, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 95,
97-98 (2006) (though disagreeing, acknowledging that the doctrine is most commonly
supported as an instance of justifiable paternalism).
96. Michael J. Herbert, Unconscionability Under Article 2A, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 715,
723 (1990) (“In practice, however, it has generally been true that courts are reluctant to
find a contract or a contract clause unconscionable . . . unless there are at least some
elements of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.”).
97. Procedural unconscionability is thus an analogue of procedural due process to the
(weak) extent it applies to lawmaking. Much of our procedural due process law, however, is
aimed at regulating the procedure of adjudication. That is, it is part of the Procedure metalaw in this taxonomy.
98. See generally Philip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (2003).
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rules of public and private lawmaking are consequences of two
general principles. Obviously, much more work is possible here.
Understanding substantive constraints as problems of institutional
competencies opens a new window into the analysis of our own
contract and constitutional law.
B. Tort and Crime: The Principles Applied to Procedure
Just as legal systems maintain secondary rules to govern
lawmakers, they maintain secondary rules to govern the prosecution
of claims that the laws have been broken. In the model, I have
labeled this body of meta-law Procedure. Procedure governs the
choice between public and private prosecution and the methods of
and limitations on bringing of causes of action.
In this section, I will restrict attention to what Procedure should
prescribe for the enforcement of publicly made law, which can either
be Tort or Criminal Law depending on whether prosecution is
initiated privately or publicly, respectively. Applying the basic
principles and using the institutional calculus will lead to
conclusions concerning which sorts of public laws are appropriate for
each category.
Historical-substantive analysis of the crime/tort boundary is
fraught with confusion. “Many people . . . have tried to answer the
question, ‘What is the essential difference between tort law and
criminal law?’ One important lesson of historical studies . . . is that
the question has no answer.”99 But the difference between Tort and
Criminal Law is more or less sharp, depending on our choice among
the many valid definitions we could affix to these terms. What I call
Criminal Law is the set of all publicly created duties that are
enforced publicly rather than privately. To be more specific, by
“enforced publicly,” I mean that the public decides whether it will
adjudicate an alleged breach of a publicly created duty.100 Focusing
99. David Friedman, Beyond the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 103, 108 (1996).
100. To simplify the present analysis, I assume here that the power to force
adjudication carries with it the obligation to fund and carry out prosecution. It is of course
a theoretical possibility that a system can split these responsibilities. There are reasons,
based in the atomic advantages, to believe that control will rarely be truly split. In the
privately solicitous societies captured by this Part’s assumptions, it would be anomalous
for a public to force a private citizen to spend money and effort prosecuting against the
individual’s will. It would be similarly problematic if any individual could force government
prosecution. Societies that permit the private invocation of public prosecution resources
must ultimately have methods to control the fiscal impact, whether the ability to refuse to
prosecute altogether or procedural means that can quickly and efficiently weed out
frivolous claims. In either of the above cases, one would expect the entity charged with
prosecuting often to have the power to decline, i.e., the power to decide whether to be
burdened with prosecution. But I will leave this potential complication for another day,
and assume for purposes of this Article that the two powers/obligations are identical.
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on institutional control over a specific question provides a relatively
clear delineation.101
In this section, I begin by surveying several other methods of
segregating Crime and Tort that have appeared in the literature, all
focused on substantive methods of classification. I then analyze this
boundary using the basic principles and the public/private
institutional calculus, noting the fit and lack thereof with existing
methods. Finally, I turn to the recent case of Robertson v. United
States ex rel. Watson,102 in which the Supreme Court asked, but
ultimately refused to decide, whether private parties could
constitutionally bring criminal contempt actions.103 The model
provides a helpful lens through which to study this question.
1. Some Existing Approaches to the Tort/Crime Problem
Even today the literature has not settled on what exactly is a tort
and what is a crime.104 It has been suggested that the difference
might center on whether the breach of the duty should be attended
with moral stigma, whether the breach of the duty should be seen as
undesirable always or only if causing an uncompensated harm, or
whether the remedy seeks to correct a distributive imbalance by
transferring wealth or to punish by making the defendant poorer.105
Confusion as to what distinguishes “torts” from “crimes” in our
legal heritage is ancient. Blackstone wrote that “the king, in whom
centers the majesty of the whole community, is supposed by the law
to be the person injured by every infraction of the public right
belonging to that community, and is therefore in all cases the proper
prosecutor for every public offence.”106 The assertions implicit in that
101. Note that the Criminal Law category in the model includes administrative actions
against individuals and other cases that might normally be called “civil,” owing to the type
of remedy sought, the amount of stigma intended, and possibly the procedures desired.
These other notions of what separates civil and criminal are discussed below.
102. Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010).
103. Id. at 2185, 2190.
104. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, What is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of
Contemporary Tort Reform, 51 MD. L. REV. 172, 172 (1992) (“On their first day of law
school, students falter until, eventually, it emerges that a tort is a civil wrong not arising
out of contract. This almost completely circular definition is not enlightening . . . .”).
105. See Friedman, supra note 99, at 108-09. Friedman argues that none of these three
are essential and that there are or have been causes of action accompanying each
combination of choices. Id.
106. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. Blackstone elaborated:
The distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes and
misdemeanors from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this:
that private wrongs or civil injuries are an infringement or privation of
the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as
individuals: public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach
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formulation are (a) that some law violations harm the public at large
and (b) that in these cases the public is the proper prosecutor. Thus,
taking an approach opposite of mine, Blackstone set up Crime as a
category defined by whether the infraction causes public, rather than
private, harm.107 From this, we can deduce, supposedly, that the
prosecution of crimes ought to be public.
In fact, as David Seipp has described in an excellent historical
analysis, there was no distinct boundary between tort and crime in
medieval England.108 One could choose to sue in “crime” or in “tort.”109
Suing in crime, through a cause of action called an “appeal of felony,”
made available vengeful remedies that could not be pursued in tort.110
Blackstone described the “appeal” as an enforcement of criminal
law “merely at the suit of the [private] subject.”111 More specifically, it
was “an accusation by a private subject against another, for some
heinous crime; demanding punishment on account of the particular
injury suffered, rather than for the offence against the public.”112 This
action was not merely a companion civil action to a public criminal
prosecution. A verdict from an appeal was binding on the Crown,
precluding prosecution after acquittal.113 And on conviction the
defendant would “suffer the same judgment, as if he had been
convicted by [public prosecution] . . . .”114

and violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole
community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity.
Id. at *5.
107. This approach to understanding the Tort/Crime divide is quite common and, as we
shall see, natural. Randy Barnett has written about this kind of public/private distinction
but in a more nuanced fashion, appreciating that some actions are “criminal” because of
their harmful private effects, more so than attenuated public harms that flow secondarily
from the private victim’s loss. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public
Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 268-69 (1986).
108. David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common
Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 59-60 (1996).
109. Id. at 59.
110. See id. at 61-68.
111. BLACKSTONE, supra note 106, at *312.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *315. Interestingly, private prosecution by appeal could be had after
acquittal or plea arising from public prosecution. Id.
114. Id. at *316. This included execution at one time:
[A]ll the relations of [a murder victim] should drag the appellee to the
place of execution; a custom founded upon that savage spirit of family
resentment, which prevailed universally through Europe, after the
irruption of the northern nations, and is peculiarly attended to in their
several codes of law; and which prevails even now among the wild and
untutored inhabitants of America . . . .
Id. (footnote omitted).
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According to Seipp, the essence of the crime/tort distinction in (at
least much of) medieval English history rested on the choice of the
victim to seek vengeance, through appeal, or compensation, through
writ of trespass.115 “[Victims] could either put their wrongdoers to
death and collect nothing, or collect money for themselves and leave
their wrongdoers alive with the rest of their wealth intact.”116 In
fact, private prosecution of crimes was very much the norm in
eighteenth-century England, even though the actions bore the name
of the Crown.117
David Friedman and others have asked, quite sensibly, why
anyone would undertake the great expense of providing what
amounts to a public good, the pursuit of non-compensatory,
uncapturable public benefits, or at least a private good with
significant public spillover benefits.118 There are a number of possible
answers, including the potential for private prosecutors to extract
large, private settlements using the threat of harsh, criminal
remedies.119 But the expense of investigation and prosecution drove
many individuals of average means to form prosecuting syndicates.
As Friedman describes:
A group of potential victims, usually residents of the same town,
would each contribute a few pounds to a common fund that they
would use to pay the cost of prosecuting a felony committed against
any of them. The members of the association would publish their
names in the local newspaper, in part, presumably, for the benefit of
local criminals. Thousands of such associations were created in
England in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.120

We therefore have an instance of a collection of privately
enforceable, publicly beneficial laws around which at least some
markets created collective prosecution solutions. The move toward
private collectivism, by which I mean only that individuals within a
collective formed a sub-collective to meet their needs, should prompt
us to ask whether a private prosecution model makes sense for such
laws. An analysis of the atomic advantages suggests that such

115. See Seipp, supra note 108, at 84.
116. Id.
117. See Friedman, supra note 99, at 103 (“[A] private party, usually the victim,
initiated the action, located witnesses, arranged for them to appear in court, and fulfilled
almost all of the functions that we associate with a public prosecutor.”).
118. Id. at 103-05.
119. Friedman notes: “In both eras there were legal rules designed to prevent private
prosecutors from dropping their charges in exchange for payment, but in both there is
reason to believe that the courts did not always enforce those rules.” Id. at 105
(footnote omitted).
120. Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted).
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syndicates were attempts to solve predictable resource and
distributive problems faced by individual, private prosecutors.121
One might also attempt to divide Crime from Tort based on the
kinds of remedies available or the measure of stigma imposed.
Though some remedies, imprisonment and corporeal punishments for
example, seem distinctly criminal and also symbolic of an effort to
impose moral condemnation, other remedies under our criminal law,
such as fines, do not appear all that different from the kinds of
coercion ordered in a Tort case.122
2. Tort and Crime in the Model
We can more fruitfully explore a legal system by reversing the
analysis: which institution, private individuals or the public, should
bring adjudications to achieve our various legal goals? That is the
question posed by this dimension of the model, whether the decision
to spend resources adjudicating a law violation is privately or
publicly controlled.123 Like other public/private distinctions, we
should expect that the answer will be composed of the atomic
arguments, the particular weight and arrangement of which will
depend on more basic societal norms.
The two trans-substantive principles provide a starting point. The
first principle demands, ex ante, that our private and public
prosecutors be defined and procedurally constrained to provide likely
institutional competency. The second principle conditions validity of
prosecution on output that is not manifestly indicative, ex post, of

121. I leave for another day the question whether such problems are best achieved with
collectivizing market innovations or with socialized prosecution of crime.
122. It seems to me difficult to divide criminal sanctions from administrative
sanctions. In our own criminal law, constitutional regulation and legal form do in fact vary
with the gravity of the punishment. But even this sort of spectrum is not without
controversy. Whether two months’ imprisonment is a “lighter” punishment than a $10,000
fine is quite obviously a matter of circumstance-bound opinion.
123. This is not at all a novel way of looking at the distinction. Indeed, it was the view
of the Romans. See James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of
Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 29, 38-39 (1996); see also JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 8 (Peter
Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 1987) (“[C]rimes are wrongs which society pursues, taking
action through some representative, sometimes an official, sometimes any member of the
public; civil wrongs are those for which the victim must bring his own action, if he can and
will.”). The further question of what kinds of laws, exactly, should be privately prosecuted
and which publicly prosecuted depends, as I argue, on the chemistry of the atomic
advantages. Lindgren uses the criterion that others have used to define Criminal Law as a
reason to resort to Criminal Law (i.e. resorting to public prosecution): the presence of a
“public” wrong. Lindgren, supra, at 40 (“[T]he public character of the offense is the
paramount characteristic, wrongdoing or blameworthiness being relegated to a rationale or
a side constraint. In general (though not in every instance), crimes are public wrongs,
while torts are private wrongs.”).
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institutional incompetence. We can again presume that private
prosecution is preferable, while public prosecution must be justified.
(a) The Trans-substantive Principles in Procedure
Beginning with the first principle, it is helpful to imagine, with
respect to the kinds of problems we think law is needed to address,
what we want the law to do. That is, assuming a particular public
law, does Procedure demand it be prosecuted publicly or privately, or
does Procedure place the law in a zone of twilight in which either
might prosecute? Is there a concept like consent that can be used to
identify broad swaths of publicly-made law amendable to private
control? The answer is yes, and the solution lies in observing the
symmetry between the lawmaking and prosecution inquiries.
The reason consent to make law among private parties satisfies
the first principle is that a consenting group has generally
internalized all the costs, conceived broadly, of its actions, and
concluded that the law’s benefit is worth those costs. This is the key
to identifying first-principle-compliant Procedural rules. When a
private party sufficiently internalizes the costs and benefits of
prosecution and is fully able to balance them against the law’s
benefit, he or she will be an atomically advantaged prosecutor. The
questions then, to determine whether the first principle is satisfied,
are whether private prosecution of a law will provide benefits that
can be internalized and whether there is sufficient, if not complete,
internalization of the costs of adjudication.
Interestingly, the application of the first principle reveals a
similar disparity across the public and private Procedural dimension
as it did across the Constitutional dimension. Namely, determining
the ex ante competency of a private party is a fact-bound inquiry. It
is, though called by different names, a question of standing—whether
this private party is well-suited to decide whether adjudication is
worth its costs. This requires us to decide whether the private party
would be entitled to benefits if victorious and is within the zone of
interests of the law. Only then would the private party internalize
the important elements of the social decision whether prosecution is
warranted. At that point, Procedure still demands that the
prosecution be conducted in accordance with rules meant to conserve
atomic competency.
In contrast, public prosecutors are identified and governed almost
entirely by rule-based structural provisions. The provisions
themselves, as an ex ante matter, satisfy us that whoever is put in
the position of public prosecutor will likely be atomically competent.
If it were otherwise, after all, we would change them. The question of
what these rules should be is an interesting and specific application
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of the institutional calculus and is a twin to the sort of analysis
Vermeule undertakes with respect to the Constitutional Law of
congressional procedure.124
The second principle, in contrast, demands rules of Procedure to
analyze prosecutorial output for manifest failing, despite the ex ante
appropriateness of the prosecuting institution. Prosecution that turns
out to be distributively flawed, for example, or to have been brought
for a reason other than the public purpose for which the cause of
action exists is subject to sanction, through procedural rules,
auxiliary torts, or even criminal law.125
(b) Application of the Principles
I will briefly consider two different kinds of legal goals and
consider what a generic but welfare-driven collective might make of
the prosecution question as an ex ante, meaning first principle,
matter. In both of these, the basic problems are (a) that private
parties making unilateral prosecution decisions are at a distributive
disadvantage, meaning they are not likely to consider fully the
impact of the adjudication on others, and (b) that bringing a law
violation to a successful adjudication can be expensive, such that the
public usually, but not always, has significant resource advantages.
First, consider purely compensatory law. Imagine that a legal
violation has occurred resulting in injury to some victim. The law in
question has no other goal apart from making the victim whole. The
question that must be answered is whether adjudication of this
violation is worth its costs. Is the victim or the public in a better
position to come closest to a socially optimal answer?
Where the victim can recover, at most, an amount roughly tied to
his or her loss, we can expect victims, again roughly, to pursue
adjudication when the injury was bad enough, and thus expected
compensation high enough, to cover his or her own expected litigation
costs. Though the victim will not internalize all of the litigation costs,
124. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
125. Public prosecutors are rarely disciplined for their misconduct or alleged
misconduct, but private malicious prosecutions have often been brought. See Kalina v.
Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123-27, 124 n.11 (1997) (restating that prior Supreme Court
decisions had “granted a broader immunity to public prosecutors than had been available
in malicious prosecution actions against private persons who brought prosecutions at early
common law”); see also Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity,
2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 53, 53 (2005) (“ ‘[T]he safeguards built into the judicial system tend to
reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional
conduct.’ ” (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1990))). The Supreme Court has
suggested this may also be based on “firmly established common-law rules providing
absolute immunity for judges and jurors” but not for purely private actors. Kalina, 522 U.S.
at 124 n.11.
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and is thus at a distributive disadvantage, there is a rough
proportionality at work that can be attuned to prevent too much
useless adjudication.126 The uncertainty of the result, the amount in
controversy, and the expense of litigation all work in tandem to yield
a probabilistic calculus that could be calibrated to capture reasonably
well the analysis that would be undertaken by a benevolent,
omniscient dictator who in his or her heart would really know
whether the adjudication was worthwhile.
Although the private prosecutor is undeniably at a distributive
disadvantage, so long as he or she is made to internalize costs in
decent proportion to those he or she is imposing on others, that
disadvantage is controlled just enough that we can say that the
private calculation benefits of private prosecution ought to be allowed
to rule the day.127 Thus, we would expect to find Tort where the
private prosecutor’s distributive disadvantage is reasonably controlled,
often by burdening him or her with proportionally significant litigation
expense and secondary rules against malicious prosecution.
This analysis, however, leaves out another source of overall
private disadvantage: resource disadvantage. But if the expected
return from a lawsuit is reasonable, the market should provide the
victim with access to the capital needed to sue. Indeed, contingency
fee arrangements show how the market can provide the capital
necessary for suits with reasonable, potential returns. The capital
providers are now agents that perform the risk calculus described
above to decide whether to prosecute.128 And the public may actually
have to expend more resources to be as well positioned as the victim
to put on a case, finding itself at a resource disadvantage.
Is there, then, a place for Crime among purely compensatory
laws? Put differently, are there compensatory laws as to which the
126. I mean, here, adjudication that is not worth its costs, owing perhaps to its small
chance of success or limited potential compensation.
127. I leave aside the possibility of schadenfreude, where the individual actually gains
utility from imposing costs on another. There is probably no practical way of eliminating
these vengeful passions from the legal landscape, but second-principle-derived court
sanctions and malicious prosecution torts are efforts to control them, trying to maintain
just enough cost internalization to align the private, selfish prosecution decision with the
socially optimal one. The first principle suggests that either private prosecution be
disallowed entirely or that the secondary rules punishing wrongful prosecution have
special force in those areas in which schadenfreude is particularly likely. Examples might
include dissolution actions and, especially, custody disputes, where the adjudicator may
need to play a more inquisitorial role.
128. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort
Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 82 (2003) (“[C]ontingency fee
lawyers assemble portfolios of cases, carefully screening claims and selecting only those
which they expect to generate returns at least equal to their opportunity costs.”) (footnotes
omitted). Even after choosing to prosecute, lawyers increase or decrease capital allocation
as a case’s prospects change. Id.
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first principle finds private prosecutors to be atomically wanting but
where public prosecutors are not? The model and the first principle
encourage us to look for examples atom by atom. For compensatory
laws, where there is good reason to think that private prosecution
will only occur when seeking that compensation is worthwhile, a lack
of resources might be a key barrier to private prosecution.
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell have pointed to several
reasons why the resource disadvantage may be unusually high for
some violations of such laws.129 First, where prosecution will be very
expensive, as in cases in which the identity of the perpetrator is
unknown and thus pre-adjudication investigatory costs are incurred
(and often hard to estimate), capital will obviously be harder to raise.
The more uncertain the investigatory project, the truer this is, even if
there is social conviction that compensation ought to occur and that it
is worth spending a great deal to achieve it.
Second, at least some types of investigatory capacities may be
natural monopolies, and so it is unrealistic to expect the private
market to provide them. Polinsky and Shavell cite fingerprint
databases as a possible example.130 The collective as a whole has a
tremendous resource advantage in establishing and maintaining
large, expensive, universal, coordinated systems. Not only might it
have a capital advantage, but the public may also have abilities
unavailable to private parties to coerce cooperation and protect its
monopoly status.
Finally, private parties may find themselves at a resource
disadvantage relative to the public because of the public’s access to
forceful means, and presumably therefore much cheaper means, of
gathering information. “[F]orce may be needed to gather information,
capture violators, and prevent reprisal, yet the state frequently, if not
usually, will not want to permit private parties to use force.”131
What of laws that are intended to do things other than
compensate? To begin, we should note that there are a number of
non-compensatory goals that nonetheless can be assimilated to
compensation for our purposes. Any public goal that consists solely in
129. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (2000).
130. Id. I describe this as a resource disadvantage of the victim, because the victim
does not have access to the resources necessary to effect a decision to prosecute. The reason
the market does not provide the resources is that “private parties may find it hard to
capture fully the benefits of developing expensive, but socially worthwhile, information
systems.” Id. In other words, private parties deciding whether to invest in such systems are
at a distributive disadvantage compared to the public. Such parties disregard the external
benefits to others, benefits they cannot capture, and may selfishly decide not to make a
socially efficient investment.
131. Id.
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securing benefits for a private victim can be analyzed as above. The
victim’s private interests in effecting coercion for violations of such
laws are the same as the public’s. So long as the private prosecutor’s
distributive disadvantage is controlled and the resource disadvantage
not too large, the first principle is satisfied and we would expect
private individuals to make good prosecution decisions.132 For
example, if the law’s goal is to deter the defendant from again
harming the victim, exemplary damages, though not exactly
compensatory, have an essentially private purpose, and the benefits
are amenable to complete capture by the victim.133
So too does the model capture a desire to provide a forum for a
private party to vindicate dignitary interests. I consider a law to be
compensatory when its benefits can be privately captured. These
benefits, obviously, need not be purely monetary. A law intended to
benefit a private party by granting a forum to gain public disapproval
of another is such a law and could properly be a Tort law.
A problem arises, however, with laws that protect private
individuals but which are also intended to confer non-compensatory,
public benefits. Why have such goals? For one, compensation is not
always possible or effective, as damage flowing from some types of
132. The categorization here is therefore consistent with, though more expansive than,
the understanding of tort law supported by civil recourse theorists. See, e.g., Jason M.
Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1784-87 (2007) (contrasting the civil
recourse theory of tort law with the corrective justice theory). With their focus primarily on
“ ‘what the plaintiff is entitled to get’ ” rather than only on “ ‘what the defendant has
done,’ ” civil recourse theorists understand tort law in a manner consistent with the first
principle: focused on whether a private party is an appropriate prosecutor and if so
granting the party the right, but not the obligation, to prosecute. Id. at 1786 (discussing
and quoting Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695,
733 (2003)). Because they are still interested in a substantive core that can be called “tort
law,” the civil recourse theorists look to define torts based on criteria concerning
“wrongfulness,” but at least wrongfulness relative to the private prosecutor. I am more
agnostic about the substantive content of the category, leaving open that there can be
reasons other than moral wrongfulness that render a private party atomically competent to
prosecute the violation of a publicly made law. Obviously, this more expansive
understanding of Tort Law could be only semantic: recourse theorists are concerned with
“tort law,” and I am concerned with “Tort Law,” which includes other privately prosecuted
public laws. I argue, but only defend partially here, that wrongfulness is a criterion that
justifies inclusion in the broader category of Tort, but that the entire category, because of
the institutional alignment, is governed by fairly consistent Constitutional and Procedural
rules. That is, a group of laws’ institutional similarity is generally more important than
any historical-substantive similarity.
133. To the extent that we try to generalize this, say by calibrating the law to permit a
private prosecutor to capture deterrence-based benefits enforcement bestows on others, for
example by assessing punitive damages, we solve one distributive problem but create a
calculation problem. When the deterrence benefits are solely monetary, and not in kind (for
example, a grant of a restraining order protecting the victim-prosecutor) the private
prosecutor no longer evaluates the worth of prosecution based on the benefits of deterrence
as perceived by the victim, but rather only as monetized (imperfectly) by the public and
made available to successful prosecutors.
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conduct “typically exceed[s] the injurer’s wealth.”134 Even if
compensation might make a victim whole, the benefit of deterring
similar injuries caused by this defendant or by others can justify
additional prosecution effort than would be rationally undertaken to
achieve compensation alone. And, of course, the expression of moral
condemnation that prosecution can result in is not necessarily
related to a desire to compensate any identifiable victim. We need not
identify all such rationales now, as it is enough to observe that
collectives do sometimes have non-compensatory goals for public laws.
In these cases, private decisions not to prosecute may be distributively
erroneous, because they will tend to ignore the public benefits of
prosecution that cannot be captured by the private prosecutor.
Randy Barnett describes the problem:
The enforcement of legal regulation is a costly activity. If conduct
that does not work a sufficiently great private harm—that is,
conduct that does not sufficiently harm a particular individual or
discrete group—is made the basis of a regulation of a “public
law” type, then there will likely be no one with sufficient
incentive to incur the costs of prosecution. As a result, once
public law based on “public standards” is recognized, a need
immediately arises to create “public” authorities to enforce these
kinds of legal prohibitions.135

In terms of the public/private chemistry, the argument is that private
individuals are at a potentially serious distributive disadvantage
with respect to laws that provide benefits to others. They therefore
discount those public benefits that cannot be privately captured. To
see this concretely, consider the decision whether to seek redress,
incurring investigatory and prosecution costs, against the thief of an
inexpensive bicycle. The public’s goal in redress goes beyond the
single theft. It wants to prevent other thefts by this perpetrator, his
or her descent into more serious criminality, and thefts by others who
might be buoyed by the impunity with which people seem able to
steal cheap bikes.
And so we see that understanding the distributive disadvantage of
private prosecutors plays a critical role in designing a legal system’s
Crime/Tort divide. On the input side, where the expense of
prosecution is partially externalized (through public funding of courts
and the defendant’s bearing his or her own litigation expense),
private prosecution decisions will be skewed in favor of too much
prosecution. Unless victims are made to bear the entire expense of
134. Antony W. Dnes & Jonathan S. Seaton, An Exploration of the Tort-Criminal Boundary
Using Manslaughter and Negligence Cases, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 537, 537-38 (1997).
135. Barnett, supra note 107, at 269.
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adjudication, which is only even conceivably justifiable as to laws
that have the sole goal of compensating victims, this distributive
disadvantage will encourage the overproduction of prosecution. The
disadvantage must be controlled by calibrating victim expenses and
putting in place second-principle, ex post remedies for “bad”
prosecutions.136 On the output side, where the adjudication will
provide public benefits that cannot be privately captured, prosecution
will be underprovided. The distributive disadvantage will result in
socially suboptimal investment in prosecution, meaning that it will
too often not occur or, when it does occur, lack the level of effort that
is socially justifiable in light of the adjudication's total benefits.137
While this dynamic almost always favors public prosecution, the
first principle does suggest the appropriateness of qui tam actions,
despite the fact that these actions do not compensate the private
prosecutor for any personal loss.138 This would seem to suggest that
qui tam plaintiffs lack the sort of standing that the first principle
requires, and indeed the constitutionality and wisdom of qui tam has
often been argued. But these actions are available on account of a
distinct advantage private prosecutors have in certain types of law
violations relative to public agents: resource advantage.
The False Claims Act permits private parties to sue for fraud on
the government and claim a portion of the (multiple) damages

136. This is the role of the second principle, which measures decisional output for
manifest institutional incompetency.
137. Some scholars have correctly emphasized that merely finding a potential failure of
private incentives is not enough to justify a shift to public power. We are engaged here
with a comparison of institutions, each with their own characteristic failings and
advantages. As Randy Barnett writes:
[T]he creation of a monopolistic system of “public law” enforcement (in
the second sense) generates serious social problems. “Public”
institutions are given privileges and powers normally denied to
“private” institutions—the right to confiscate resources forcibly
(“taxation” and “condemnation”), for example—and this enhanced
power increases the opportunity for corruption and the ability to abuse
those who do not have such power.
Barnett, supra note 107, at 272. Calibration through Constitutional Law would be
necessary to cure such problems. And so the analysis comes down to whether the failures of
one institution or the other are easier to ameliorate.
David Friedman has suggested that the historical move away from private criminal
prosecution might have a less benevolent explanation than avoiding private market
failures. “The right to run courts and collect fines was a valuable property right,” and a
move away from private prosecution was a move toward enlarging the power and wealth of
public authorities. Friedman, supra note 99, at 107. And so, perhaps, prosecution went
public in order to realize the disadvantages of public control.
138. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J.
341 (1989); Michael Holt & Gregory Klass, Implied Certification under the False Claims
Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 10 (2011).
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award.139 Detecting government fraud is thought to be most
efficiently performed with the help of private parties. And so, the
False Claims Act substitutes the normal first-principle standing
requirement for one focused on assuring unusual resource advantage
when the public lacks it. A qui tam “relator,” i.e. private prosecutor,
must have “direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based and [have] voluntarily provided
[such] information to the Government before filing an action . . . .”140
Courts and Congress attempt to control the relators’ distributive and
calculation advantages with secondary rules and economic incentives.
Qui tam is a reminder that while the first principle is normally
met through a sort of proxy like “standing,” it demands atomic
competency. That competency can be assured in a number of ways,
not just by requiring standing.
(c) Other Classifications as Derivative
By considering the Crime/Tort divide in institutional terms and
then analyzing the atomic advantages, we can derive the other,
muddier distinctions that have been used to describe the two fields.
These other distinctions can then be appreciated as consequences of
the inherent differences in public and private capacities. For
example, Blackstone’s “violation[s] of the public rights” are
infractions of laws that have publicly-oriented, non-compensatory
goals.141 As he concluded, public prosecution is often desirable in such
situations on account of the resulting distributive disadvantage of
private prosecutors.142
Though he arrives at some of the same results, Blackstone’s
approach is less useful and provides less clarity. Mine is a model of
the public and the private as institutions taking the fundamental
actions I believe constitute a legal system: law definition, law
enforcement, and remedy valuation. Focusing instead on the public
or private character of the laws themselves obscures the relevance of
institutional capacity in selecting public or private prosecution.143
Second, and arguably as a consequence of focusing on a public/private
facet other than institutional control, Blackstone’s approach turns
out to be horribly messy. Whether a law protects public or private
interests is a question that quite obviously invites hybrid answers.
Some laws do both and to different degrees, and much will be in the
139. Holt & Klass, supra note 138, at 9-12.
140. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2006).
141. BLACKSTONE, supra note 106 at 6-8.
142. Id.
143. For this reason, it would not serve my longer term purpose of establishing a basis
for analyses of the many types of institutions within legal systems.
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eye of the beholder. Duncan Kennedy’s critique would bite into such a
distinction with gusto.144
Another critical difference between our tort and criminal law that
has been observed is that “tort generally provides the same sanction
(compensatory damages) regardless of the defendant’s culpability,
while criminal law provides a sanction (punishment) that is
proportional to the defendant's culpability.”145 My model turns this
question around, resulting in a more natural policy question: (1) If we
have policy reasons to seek compensation, should we use public or
private prosecutors; and (2) if we have policy reasons to seek
sanctions proportional to culpability without regard to a victim’s
injury, should we use public or private prosecutors?
Asking the questions this way demonstrates the utility of the
atomic arguments. If private compensation can be offered in a way
that minimizes the inherent distributive disadvantage of private
prosecutors, through upfront expense and auxiliary rules, then the
superior private calculation advantages of victims may be enough to
make them superior prosecutors. There will be cases, though, where
society prefers compensation despite the fact that achieving it costs
more than a victim himself or herself would be willing to pay. In
some cases, the public’s superior investigatory and adjudicatory
resources can achieve prosecution at a cost that would be privately
acceptable, if it is all the victim would have had to pay.
Where the public has reason to seek non-compensatory remedies,
private prosecutors’ distributive disadvantage must be dealt with. In
cases in which the benefits of adjudication can be captured
accurately, such as the value to a victim of a restraining order or a
well-tuned incentive to private attorneys-general, perhaps private
prosecution can work. Generally, though, the public is the institution
of choice to pursue remedies that are meant to achieve benefits
extending beyond the victim.
(d) Historical-Substantive Misalignment
A primary source of friction between our tort and our criminal law
comes in the form of private pursuit of such non-compensatory
144. Blackstone acknowledged this ambiguity, writing that “[i]n all cases the crime
includes an injury: every public offence is also a private wrong, and somewhat more: it
affects the individual, and it likewise affects the community.” BLACKSTONE, supra note
106, at *5. He went on to argue that Crime is found wherever there is injury to the public
as a whole. Id. at *6-7. There may also be private redress for the purely private injuries
resulting from the same acts, but these are often, at least with respect to more serious
crimes, ineffective as compensation. Id.; see also Barnett, supra note 107, at 268.
145. Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273,
296-97 (1996).
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remedies, usually in the form of punitive damages. In the course of
supporting punitive damages in tort law, Angela Harris has attacked
the relevance of the public/private distinction.146 “As a descriptive
matter, the proposition that tort law is ‘private’ and concerned only
with compensation, whereas criminal law is ‘public’ and concerned
only with punishment, is inaccurate.”147
Of course, she is correct. But we gain finer-grained insight with a
more exacting understanding of what aspects of Contract and Tort
are private and public. Using the model, the question becomes
whether and when punitive (non-compensatory, publicly regarding)
damages make sense if prosecution is privately initiated. That is,
when a law is aimed at public as well as private harms, should the
legal system allow private prosecution, and how, in such cases,
should it handle remedies for the public portion of the harm caused
by violations? The answer to these questions will obviously involve
examining what amount of damages should be available and whether
these exemplary damages would be awarded to the private
prosecutor or to some public institution. But one cannot truly escape
the public/private distinction when thinking about punitive damages,
which are, functionally, rewards for successful private litigation, the
alternative to which would be public prosecution. We are thus faced
with a problem of institutional choice.
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on the constitutionality
of punitive damages can be understood as an effort to restrict the
permissible punitive goals subject to private prosecution to those
remedies least likely to promote heavily disadvantaged prosecutions.
Among the main holdings: a requirement that punitive damages be a
reasonable, perhaps even single-digit,148 multiple of compensatory
damages and a requirement that the punitives that are imposed be
based on conduct toward the plaintiff, not non-parties.149
These requirements have in common an aim to tie the private
prosecution reward closely to the wrongful harm to the victimprosecutor. That is, punitive damages must be engineered to steer
146. Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: Beyond the Public/Private
Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1079-82 (1989).
147. Id. at 1082.
148. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). For an
excellent summary of the Court’s evolving punitive damages jurisprudence, see generally
Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages in the
Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 451-57 (2010).
149. See Philip Morris v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357 (2007). In fact, in some states,
“punitive” damages are only permitted to the extent they are “compensatory.” See, e.g.,
Miller v. Drouin, 438 A.2d 863, 864 (Conn. 1981) (“In this state even punitive damages are
designed not to punish the defendant for his offense but rather to compensate the plaintiff
for his injuries.”). Where compensation is explicitly the goal, the advantages, in a wellcalibrated system, point toward private prosecution.
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close to the compensatory goals that the chemistry of advantages
usually suggests is appropriate for private prosecution. Prosecution
choices made by victims under such a reward paradigm will be better
positioned distributively than when out of proportion damages are
possible. In that latter case, the rough semblance of litigation costinternalization discussed, supra, is lost, and litigation will be overprovided. And when the private prosecutor has the opportunity to
recover for harms done to others, the private calculation benefits of
private litigation are lost.
I do not intend here to defend the Supreme Court’s recent punitive
damages jurisprudence. But I offer the above arguments as
suggestions for how the small number of tools implicit in the model
can be used to analyze the issue.
3. Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson
The problem of a particular law’s place in the prosecutorial
dimension of the model arose recently in the United States Supreme
Court. The question on which the Court took certiorari was whether
“an action for criminal contempt in a congressionally created court
may constitutionally be brought in the name and pursuant to the
power of a private person, rather than in the name and pursuant to
the power of the United States.”150 Is the old English practice of
private prosecution to achieve “vengeful remedies” consistent with the
U.S. Constitution? Though the Court dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted, four justices, led by Justice Roberts, dissented
and would have held that private parties cannot bring such actions.151
The contempt charge arose from a domestic violence case. After an
assault committed by her boyfriend, Ms. Watson obtained a
restraining order. The boyfriend, Mr. Robertson, violated the order.
He thereafter reached a plea agreement with the government
concerning the original assault. In exchange for the plea, the
government agreed, among other things, not to pursue charges
stemming from the violation of the restraining order. Without regard
to the agreement, Ms. Watson, herself, “filed a motion to initiate
criminal contempt proceedings against Robertson for violating the
civil protective order.”152 The court conducted a bench trial and found
Robertson guilty of criminal contempt, sentencing him to probation
and nearly a year in prison and also ordering him to pay restitution
to Watson.153
150.
151.
152.
153.

Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.

2012]

LAW’S PUBLIC/PRIVATE STRUCTURE

1061

Robertson argued that the plea agreement with the government
forbade it from pursuing charges based on the violation of the
protective order, and since only the sovereign may prosecute
criminal contempt, any adjudication of that charge would amount
to a double jeopardy violation.154 As has been mentioned, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari with the intention of examining
the piece of that argument asserting that contempt may only be
brought by the sovereign.
The dissenters’ argument against private enforcement of criminal
contempt came down to the following lines of attack. (1) The
constitutional protections for criminal defendants are all written as
limitations on governmental action, demonstrating an implicit intent
by the Framers to restrict criminal prosecution to public authorities.
(2) Where “private” prosecution has been and is permitted, it is
understood that the private party is only an agent of the government
and that the state is the real prosecutor. (3) Even if some contempt
actions are civil, this one was criminal on account of the evident
statutory intent to classify it as such and in light of the penalties
attached to it.
The dissenters summarized:
A basic step in organizing a civilized society is to take that sword
out of private hands and turn it over to an organized government,
acting on behalf of all the people. Indeed, “[t]he . . . power a man
has in the state of nature is the power to punish the crimes
committed against that law. [But this] he gives up when he joins [a]
. . . political society, and incorporates into [a] commonwealth.”155

The key word here is “sword.” At a more abstract level than the
doctrinal analysis that preceded it, Justice Roberts asserted that
laws that punish, rather than compensate, are enforced under the
power of and at the discretion of the sovereign.
Under my model, and without the constraint of attempting to fit
this case into any ambiguous doctrinal line, we would proceed a little
differently. First, the question whether private prosecution is
permitted is the question whether “criminal contempt” is a Tort or
Criminal cause of action. By contrast, the dissenters considered
whether (1) the law at issue was “criminal” and, then, (2) whether
private entities can enforce criminal laws. These are not separate
questions in my model. But the analysis that goes into the first
question should be, to the extent possible, used to answer directly
whether private prosecution is justified.
154. Id. at 2186.
155. Id. at 2190 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil
Government, § 128).
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The dissenters bifurcate the legal conflict in this case, confronting
two legal uncertainties. What is crime? And can private citizens
prosecute crime? If crime is defined to be the category of actions that
are prosecuted by the government, then the former question
automatically answers the latter. But we are still left to ask: What
kinds of actions should be restricted to government prosecution? This
question comes closest to getting at the heart of what is intuitively
difficult about Robertson.
Should private parties be prohibited from compelling adjudication
of this kind? As has been discussed above, it makes sense to take
control away from private parties when they are significantly
disadvantaged but where the public is not. As argued above, under
the first principle, non-compensatory, public goals are generally not
suitably protected by private adjudication, the public/private atoms
pointing at both over- and under-provision problems. And so most
criminal matters, with punishments calculated to deter both the
defendant and other potential criminals who would harm other
victims, are not efficiently brought by private prosecutors. Robertson,
however, is not such a case.156
Ensuring compliance with the protective order through punitive
sanctions was clearly designed, in this case, to deter future harm to
Ms. Watson, not to the public at large. Though the public benefits if
people like Ms. Watson are able to feel safe, she is not as
disadvantaged in pursuing punitive sanctions as private prosecutors
in other criminal cases pursuing punishments tuned to procure nonprivate benefits. The enforcement of this law, unlike many other
criminal laws and owing to the nature of a protective order in a
domestic violence case, redounds almost entirely to her benefit. Thus,
this judge-made law is compensatory, and so Ms. Watson’s
prosecution of it is consistent with the first principle. After all, she is
probably as well positioned as the public to determine whether the
benefits of prosecution are worth the costs of prosecution. Relative to
public prosecutors, she is not distributively disadvantaged in valuing
the preferences of other members of the public, meaning her
prosecution decisions will not be distorted by discounting the
preferences of other potential victims, unlike in most other criminal
prosecutions. It is arguable that we need not worry that prosecution
will be under-provided in such cases.157
156. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
157. Prosecution is under-provided, within my meaning here, if prosecutions do not
occur that would be socially desirable, either because society values Ms. Watson’s
preferences, for example, or because it would advance other social goals. The point, here, is
that Ms. Watson as prosecutor satisfies the first principle, and so we should be relatively
confident that she will prosecute when prosecution is publicly desirable.
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Over-provision may not be a problem either. It is true that where
the sword of justice may cause great injury to a convicted defendant
and where the victim (or tormentor, as the case may be) is made
happy by the defendant’s suffering, an incentive to prosecute arises
that serves no valid public purpose. But again, in Robertson, the
remedy is attuned to avert harm to Ms. Watson. Her pursuit of the
cause of action does no more than force the Court to determine
whether a proportional remedy is warranted in light of the breach of
an order intended to protect her, not the public generally, from harm.
In other words, not only does she capture the benefits of prosecution,
but those benefits are calculated to do no more than deter harm to
her specifically. Her protection is the public purpose. This quasicompensatory purpose, full private capture with little public
spillover, suggests that she will not be at a great distributive
disadvantage to public prosecutors with respect to the defendant. Nor
will she be at a public calculation or aggregative disadvantage, since
her own safety is the object of the law.
Private prosecution, whether classified in the historicalsubstantive framework as civil or criminal, always carries with it
some additional monitoring costs. This is so because of the strong
private incentive to evade defendant-protecting prosecutorial
practices compelled by Procedural and Constitutional rules, rules
intended to ensure better accuracy in light of the gravity of the
punishment.158 Being fair in litigation is a cost the distributively
imperfect litigant will seek to avoid. But this is true also of public
prosecutors, even if to a lesser extent. The second principle yields
secondary rules that monitor the act of prosecution for manifest
atomic failure, either controlling it through intervention by a judge or
even throwing out the prosecution. It is possible that the Robertson
case raises the danger that part of the benefit to private “criminal
contempt” plaintiffs is schadenfreude, which is likely not a private
preference that social norms would aggregate when calculating the
public good. This is a danger in any prosecution, maybe more so in
private prosecutions, and maybe more so still if the remedies impose
liberty deprivations on the defendant. As discussed above, there is
reason to think that this is less a problem here, but certainly the
second principle would indicate a greater role for judicial monitoring
because of the danger.
158. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 562 (1994); see also New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp.
747, 753-54 (D.N.J. 1991) (noting that malicious prosecution actions are not sufficiently
corrective, owing to the difficulty of meeting the standards of proof and the inherent
difficulties of policing a variety of Due Process violations, including the withholding of
Brady material).
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In sum, Robertson asked whether the enforcement of contempt
orders focused on purely private protections, where punitive
remedies could be imposed, is appropriate for a private victimprosecutor. We have seen that the first principle in many instances
compels public prosecution where the law imposes punitive
sanctions. Prosecutions for contempt of orders intended solely for the
protection of the victim might, however, be an area where privately
sought punishment is consistent with the first principle.
C. Illuminating Law’s Darker Corners
The second type of implication I will highlight in this initial
sketch is the illumination of seemingly ad hoc areas of our law as
bearing structural significance. All laws have some place within the
model’s categories. The model gives us the ability to question this
placement in light of the alternative institutional placements. It
exposes options to legal system engineers and allows them to
examine whether a law’s placement among public and private
institutions is sensible in light of the law’s purposes.
An example of an under-theorized option within the institutional
taxonomy is the category I call Parens Patriae. While Contract is by
far the more important body of private law in our own system, the
model yields a formally equal position for the enigmatic Parens
Patriae category.159 This category represents those laws made by
private parties but enforced by public authorities. Quite obviously,
such laws present an opportunity for private parties to impose on the
public the cost of pursuing their own objectives. And so we should
expect this to be a somewhat sparse and perhaps even empty
category. But it is not, in American law, a null set.
Parens patriae, in its traditional, legal usage, is the doctrine
under which the state represents private individuals, traditionally
children or the incapacitated, including the beneficiaries of charitable
trusts.160 I use the phrase because it is suggestive of the type of suit
in this box, a publicly prosecuted action to enforce privately made
law. One important caveat: this category does not include so-called
parens patriae litigation by states representing their citizens in

159. The rarity of laws in this category and the particular circumstances in which it is
the most appropriate category suggest an analogy to Calabresi and Melamed’s “fourth
rule.” See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1116-17. That the model illuminates an
array of options and the circumstances in which they are sensible is one of its chief virtues.
160. See, e.g., KERRY O'HALLORAN, MYLES MCGREGOR-LOWNDES & KARLA W. SIMON,
CHARITY LAW & SOCIAL POLICY: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
FUNCTIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO CHARITIES 120 (2008).
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federal antitrust cases.161 Such suits enforce the provisions of publicly
enacted antitrust law.162 I use the term only for public suits to enforce
privately created law.
The Contract/Parens Patriae choice, on the “privately created”
side of the model, mirrors the Tort/Crime problem, on the “publicly
created” side. Under what circumstances might a collective prefer
public rather than private prosecution of privately created law, that
is Parens Patriae rather than Contract? Applying the first principle,
just as in the Tort/Crime distinction, we might opt for public
enforcement when private parties would be at a distributive or
resource disadvantage, where prosecution would be thereby underprovided or over-provided by private parties, and where public
prosecution would be less defective.
The law of charitable trusts is just such an area, and it is perhaps
the only area of American law that truly falls in the Parens Patriae
box. When a settlor has made available funds for a significant class of
individuals and for a charitable purpose, the law generally restricts
representation of the beneficial interest to the state Attorney
General. This is a longstanding rule that has been explicitly based on
the state’s duty to represent the public in parens patriae.163 The
majority of states have codified this ancient rule and require the
Attorney General to be the exclusive representative of the
beneficiaries in charitable trust cases.164 Courts examining the policy
161. See, e.g., ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 6 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §
18:55 (4th ed. 2002); Richard A. Posner, Address, Federalism and the Enforcement of
Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2004) (criticizing
the states’ use of parens patriae power in bringing antitrust actions).
162. Though this is not an illustration of what I call Parens Patriae, it is an illustration
of public prosecution of public duties. As we saw in the last section, supra, the rationale for
moving to public prosecution is similar:
[T]he three factors that normally determine whether a quasisovereign interest is sufficiently important to permit standing [to
sue as parens patriae in antitrust] are (1) the size of the segment of
the population that has been adversely affected, (2) the magnitude
of the harm inflicted, and (3) the practical ability of those injured to
obtain complete relief without intervention by the sovereign.
72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories, and Dependencies § 91 (2001) (citing P.R. ex rel. Quiros
v. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc., 632 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 458 U.S. 592 (1982)).
163. See, e.g., Trs. of Sailors’ Snug Harbor v. Carmody, 144 N.Y.S. 24, 37 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1913) (“From the earliest times the Attorney-General, in England and in other
jurisdictions where trusts for charitable uses have been recognized, has been regarded as
the representative of the uncertain beneficiaries of a charity.”).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391, cmt. a (1959); see also, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 3-125 (2011). There are exceptions, including the permitting of suits by
beneficiaries with “special interests.” See, e.g., Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians &
Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 753 (1964) (discussing types of special interests that support the
power to enforce a charitable trust).
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basis for this rule have concluded that placing exclusive enforcement
power in public hands protects the limited charitable funds, and thus
the settlor’s intent, from depletion in litigation by various members
of a large class of the public.165
Just as with criminal prosecution, resorting to the model
chemistry helps us to see whether private parties or the public are
better positioned to decide whether resources should be devoted to
adjudication of an alleged law violation, here the terms of the trust.
Like all private prosecutors, those wishing to attack the
administration of charitable trusts are stereotypically subject to
distorting resource or distributive disadvantages. With charitable
trusts, the problem is unusually acute, justifying in at least the
subconscious minds of lawmakers severe restrictions or prohibition
on private enforcement.
The central difficulties are two-fold: the potential for over- and
under-provision of private prosecution. First, the corpus of a trust is
limited and the very purpose of the gift would be destroyed if too
much of it is spent litigating its allocation. This sets up a classic
tragedy of the commons, as an analysis of the atomic advantages
demonstrates. Private parties are at a significant distributive
disadvantage when deciding whether to litigate, as the litigation
costs are not all borne by the litigant. Some costs are spread over all
beneficiaries of the now-depleted corpus. If the potential award
exceeds the private prosecution costs, the suit will go forward, even if
the prosecution is not cost-justified in the aggregate. Prosecution
may thus be over-provided. Though this is not superficially different
from the distributive difficulty that arises in pure Contract law, the
number of potential plaintiffs changes the equation. Though we,
perhaps begrudgingly, accept distributively imperfect prosecution
decisions in Contract, where the parties have accounted for this
possibility and have means to discourage one another, charitable
trusts present a different case. The sheer number of distributively
imperfect, potential prosecutors is much more likely to lead to
inefficient surplus depletion than in other kinds of contracts.166
Second, where a charitable trust provides relatively small gifts to
a large class, there is a danger that prosecution will be underprovided, again owing to the distributive disadvantage of private
litigants. Here again, the litigant will consider only the private
benefits and costs of litigation, and an illegally administered trust
will not offer significant enough reward to private plaintiffs to justify
165. See, e.g., Wier v. Howard Hughes Med. Inst., 407 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1979).
166. After all, charitable trusts are characterized by the generality of beneficiaries.
From my perspective, though, this identifiable feature is what leads us to define the
category and treat it differently by placing it in the Parens Patriae box.

2012]

LAW’S PUBLIC/PRIVATE STRUCTURE

1067

suit. This is precisely the problem we encountered in Crime/Tort, in
which private prosecution to accomplish non-compensatory public
goals would be under-provided. No aggrieved individual will be
willing to prosecute even when the total benefits exceed the
litigation’s costs, because no individual will be able to capture all the
benefits.167 While class actions could solve this problem (and we could
think of class action plaintiff firms like the old English prosecution
syndicates), they will run into the over-provision problem above.
D. A Possible Third Dimension: An Aspect of an Aspect of
the Cathedral
One of the core insights of Calabresi and Melamed’s “Cathedral” is
that at the heart of the question of remedies lies a choice between
public and private control of the terms of transaction in the postadjudication environment.168 The Cathedral’s normative implications
concerning property rules and liability rules derive from generic
public/private capacity arguments applied to the question of remedies.
To see why this is so, consider the basic distinction drawn by Calabresi
and Melamed between these two ways of protecting entitlements.
Property rules grant to the winner private control over the
entitlement after adjudication. The winner is entitled to prevent
transfer to the loser unless an agreement acceptable to the winner
is reached. Liability rules retain public power over the entitlement
ex post by publicly setting the value that must be transferred to
the winner in exchange for the entitlement. As Calabresi and
Melamed explain:
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that
someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder
must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value
of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller. It is the form of
entitlement which gives rise to the least amount of state
intervention: once the original entitlement is decided upon, the
state does not try to decide its value. . . . Property rules involve a
collective decision as to who is to be given an initial entitlement
but not as to the value of the entitlement.169

The property rule is a grant of private control to the winning
litigant. That person or group has the power to dictate what shall
become of the things or actions under dispute. Property rules devolve
167. This is precisely the reason Steven Shavell identifies for public enforcement, i.e.
criminal enforcement, of public health code violations, even when there are injured victims.
See generally Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract:
An Economic Analysis, 84 TEX. L. REV. 831 (2006).
168. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1090.
169. Id. at 1092 (footnote omitted).
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the question of how the world should appear after collective
intervention to the private parties to the dispute, but they entitle one
of those parties, the victor, to hold out no matter how infuriating to
the other. This typically means that the court grants an injunction to
the victor, forcing the loser, who wishes to be free of the injunction, to
meet the victor’s terms in a post-adjudication settlement.
The liability rule, by contrast, displaces the private judgment of
the victor for public judgment concerning the value of the disputed
entitlement. If the loser “is willing to pay an objectively determined
value” for an entitlement, he or she is privileged to destroy it, or, put
less aggressively, to transfer it.170 The state, not the private winner,
controls the value of the entitlement in the ex post, meaning postadjudication, negotiating environment.171 This typically means that
the court calculates and imposes damages that might be lower than
what the victor would have demanded of the loser.
Just as I have done in the lawmaking and enforcement
dimensions of the model, Calabresi and Melamed shifted our
understanding of remedies away from apparently ad hoc alternatives
tied historically and substantively to particular causes of action.172
Instead, the Cathedral correctly apprehends the remedial decision as
a choice primarily between discrete and logically arranged
institutionally defined alternatives.173 With the larger understanding
of law made possible by the taxonomy and institutional calculus,
viewing remedies as choices between institutions is an obvious move.
170. Id.
171. See id. Calabresi and Melamed introduce a third kind of remedial rule: the
inalienability rule. Id. But I do not understand the “inalienability rule” to be a separate,
qualitative category. In my terms, the inalienability rule is a limiting case of the liability
rule. Formally, the collective imposing an inalienability rule or a liability rule is taking for
itself the power to set the terms of ex post entitlement transfer. Whereas Calabresi’s and
Melamed’s liability rules encompass finite damage awards, inalienability rules are, again
formally, a conditional award of infinite damages. To see this more clearly, consider that
the higher the damages award, the less likely ex post transfer is to occur. At some point,
the damages are so high that transfer is virtually certain not to occur. This level of
damages represents a practical inalienability rule. An actual inalienability rule may
simply be viewed as the setting of damages at an impractically high level. For example, in
the iconic case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), the Court
awarded permanent damages to neighbors of a polluting cement plant but allowed the
plant to continue in operation. It did this by granting plaintiffs an injunction that would be
dissolved upon the payment of court-determined damages sufficient to compensate for the
pollution servitude that would be imposed on plaintiffs’ land by the plant’s continued
operations. Id. at 875. It is obvious that the higher these damages, the less likely the
cement plant would be inclined to pay them. At some point, the damage award exceeds the
value of the plant, and the plant will not “buy” the right to pollute. At this point, the
liability rule is a practical inalienability rule. Voluntary transfer at some lower price is
barred by a separate, publicly created prohibition on transfer that operates like any other
publicly created duty.
172. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5.
173. Id.
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Doing so renders some basic questions of remedies susceptible to the
same tools, the atoms, as the other structural dimensions. One
benefit of the general approach to legal systems I have advocated is
that it makes transparent both the shift from substantive
understandings to institutional understandings of legal systems and
the analytical consequences that follow. This work is ultimately a
generalization of this aspect of the Cathedral.
While many have elaborated on Calabresi’s and Melamed’s
analysis,174 I focus here on recovering through the model only that
part of their project that comprised an analysis of the choice between
public and private control of the terms of the post-adjudication
negotiation environment. Once the Cathedral shifted the focus from
an unorganized constellation of remedies with various substantive
goals to the distinction between the property rule and liability rule,
that is to a choice between public and private control over an
entitlement after adjudication, scholars and judges could analyze
remedies in the language of institutional capacity, unleashing the
power of the atomic arguments.
In their language, Calabresi and Melamed argue for liability rules
when the cost of valuing the disputed entitlement is high, as may
occur when one side to the dispute contains holdouts or freeloaders,
but also simply as the result of the expense of coordinating large
numbers of people.175 Furthermore, injunctions do no good to
compensate the victim of an automobile accident. We cannot rely on
the accident victim to tell us, ex post, what the injury was worth to
him or her.176 While pre-accident contracts might supply such
information, they would be impracticably expensive to enter.177
Collective valuation is justified on efficiency grounds, Calabresi
and Melamed tell us, when it efficiently removes such problems.178
174. Id. Ian Ayres and Jack Balkin have explored the question of entitlement
protection after the execution of a liability rule. Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal
Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703
(1996). That is, after the loser has paid damages, may he or she hold out on offers by the
original holder to buy back the entitlement, or may the entitlement holder pay damages
and force a re-transfer? I do not further explore here the question of higher order property
or liability rules, other than to note that at each “level,” the problem is to decide whether
private or public control over the negotiating environment is desirable. See also IAN AYRES,
OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005) (describing property rules
and liability rules in terms of option theory). Ayres’s work points to a potentially more
complex understanding of the public and private role in the ex post environment, but it does
not alter the atomic role of each concept in informing remedial decisions. The translation I
give of The Cathedral here is a beginning, not an end of this interesting dimension.
175. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1106-07.
176. See id. at 1108-09.
177. But note that, as a private market innovation, insurance could do this. Even
though it currently operates in the shadow of expected liability-rule calculations.
178. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1107.
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On the other hand, switching to a liability rule would be a mistake if,
for example, a putative holdout is in fact disclosing his true
valuation and not simply going after the largest chunk of the
collective surplus he thinks he can get, risking derailing an
otherwise Pareto-efficient transaction.179
In the institutional language of atoms, the choice between private
and public control over the ex post bargaining situation comes down
to an analysis of the public and private advantages applied to ex post
bargaining. The essential design task facing legal system engineers is
to identify easily demarcated categories of cases that will yield ex
post environments where the usual advantages of either the public or
private individuals are realized or are attenuated.
Translated into atomic language, Calabresi and Melamed have
argued (a) for liability rules when private decisionmaking will
involve distributive and resource disadvantages (holdouts and
assembly problems)180 that have the effect of blocking efficient
bargains (which they assume, in the absence of “other justice
reasons,” to be the choice of an institution with aggregative
advantage), and (b) for property rules where the public is at a severe
private calculation disadvantage (where it is much more difficult for
the public properly to assess the private ex post valuations of the
disputed entitlement).181 In other words, when do private individuals,
together, fail to have the typical private calculation advantage or
possess unusually high distributive disadvantage in the ex post
negotiating environment? Such disabilities, along with the more
stereotypical (even if slight) aggregative and public calculation
disadvantages private individuals suffer, would justify a move to
liability rules, public control, at least where the advantages of public
control exist.182
Our contract law, despite its otherwise private character, for the
most part eschews private control over remedies for precisely these
reasons. Specific performance and the enforcement of liquidated

179. See id. at 1106-08.
180. For a more quantitative analysis, see Hylton, supra note 56, at 148-50.
181. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1102-05; Hylton, supra note 56 at 15556 (explaining the importance of private calculation advantage in choosing between
property and liability rules).
182. Where there could be clear advantages in favor of public control, ensuring that
such advantages are actually obtained is an institutional design problem. That is, ensuring
that the public actually has distributive and public calculation advantage is a design task
focused on the means of choosing agents that are likely to possess these qualities over
areas of their authority. For example, requiring judges to recuse in cases in which they
have pecuniary interests is a rule of Constitutional Law meant to be conservative of
prototypical public advantages. Other “legal technologies” help dampen the public’s
calculation, aggregative, and distributive defects.
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damages, property rule protections of contractual rights, are
famously disfavored.183
Steven Shavell’s economic analysis of contracting parties’ rational
choices of property rules (specific performance) or liability rules
(expectation damages) in contract law highlights the critical role of
the atomic public/private advantages.184 In contracts to produce, he
argues, private parties take on enormous risk by agreeing to specific
performance, if the cost to perform is sufficiently uncertain and wide
in range.185 This creates the opportunity for the in-compliance
counter-party to hold out for more than the value to him or her of the
performance and may in fact lead to inefficient performance.186
Because of this, parties will themselves prefer expectation remedies,
i.e. liability rules, to govern such contracts.187 The problem, in the
language of the model, is that the private party’s inherent
distributive disadvantage becomes overwhelming in an ex post
environment involving the division of large surpluses or losses. The
private party empowered to control such an ex post environment is
distributively disadvantaged, meaning that it fails to seek a jointly
maximizing settlement. Knowing this in advance, parties contracting
for types of performance that hold the potential for large divisions
will generally opt for liability rules.
In contracts to transfer land, by contrast, the cost to perform is
generally bounded by what someone would in fact pay for the
property in the market, leading to less potential divergence between
the cost of performance and the value to the transferee and thus less
potential disruption from the transferee’s inherent distributive
disadvantage. And so, the private calculation disadvantages of liability
rules (public control) become the more concerning source of error.188
Interestingly, the model helps us to see why and where we might
want to depart from the production/transfer dichotomy. Since the
183. They are property rules, as each gives to the victor the right to insist on
performance within the terms of the contract. Alan Schwartz has famously argued that
specific performance should be more readily available. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979).
184. See Shavell, supra note 167, at 833-34.
185. Id. at 833.
186. Indeed, the non-breaching party may hold out for a sizeable portion of the cost of
performance, which, in production contracts, may be much larger than the value to the
party of the breacher’s performance.
187. Shavell, supra note 167, at 841-43.
188. See id. at 851-52. Interestingly, there are identifiable situations, even in
production contracts, in which potential private calculation errors are so large that
property rules are indicated. See id. at 846 n.48 (giving an example where “the contract is
to construct custom cabinets for a home in an area where there is no organized market for
the kind of work involved and that the court can readily determine whether the job has
been satisfactorily accomplished”).
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distinctive treatment of those areas is justified by the usual line-up of
the atoms within production and transfer scenarios, departure is
justified in subcategories where those stereotypical line-ups do not
occur. For example, production contracts in which the value of the
product is highly idiosyncratic and not subject to easy market
valuation are contracts as to which an individual’s private calculation
advantage is quite high. At least in situations where the cost of
performance is not obviously out of proportion to a conceivable
private valuation, and thus the distributive disadvantage has a
reasonably limited impact, we might opt for specific performance. A
private party’s high distributive disadvantage, at least where it is at
least somewhat controlled, can be outweighed by that party’s large
private calculation advantage.189
This brief foray into the taxonomy’s implications for a remedial
dimension of legal systems demonstrates the value of a consciously
institutional approach to legal classification. Once understood as a
problem of institutional choice, we can take stock of the state, in a
given class of cases, of the usual institutional comparators. Doing so,
applying the generic atoms systematically (but again, not
deterministically), we uncover what otherwise seem to be subjectspecific arguments. Understood as an institutional question, the
remedial question is rendered susceptible to institutional arguments,
and that fact makes the profound methods and problems of the
Cathedral transparent.
V. CONCLUSION
What I have put forward in this Article is a beginning.
Understanding legal system design as a multi-dimensional exercise
in separating public and private control has a number of
implications, uses, and mysteries. What follow are some additional
questions to explore.
Efficient Structure. This Article provides a start at understanding
a number of structural legal questions in terms of institutional
advantages. Much more is possible. For example, choosing between
private prosecutors and public agencies to enforce remedial laws is at
the heart of a number of heavily contested issues. When are
consumers best protected by private prosecutors in large class
actions, and when are they better represented by public agencies?
What are the proper subjects and limits of qui tam actions, where the
189. Shavell gives a nice example of such situations. See id. at 846 n.48 (describing a
“contract . . . to construct custom cabinets for a home in an area where there is no
organized market for the kind of work involved and [where] the court can readily
determine whether the job has been satisfactorily accomplished”).
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private prosecutor brings an action to remedy harms to the public,
not himself? I have explored briefly actions that are properly placed
in the Parens Patriae category, those brought to enforce private law
on behalf of private parties, but where private prosecution is
nonetheless structurally inferior to public prosecution. What “Filius
Patriae” actions, those meant to remedy public harms resulting from
public law violations where public prosecutors are nonetheless
inferior to private prosecutors, should be included in Tort Law?
Comparative Law. A second line of inquiry prompted by the
taxonomy is in comparative law. The taxonomy provides a method for
characterizing a legal system, and, thus, it provides a way of comparing
legal systems. Systems differ in how they populate the boxes of the
taxonomy, and examining those differences could yield interesting
insights into the fundamental distinctions between legal regimes.
Sub- and Super-Sovereigns, Pluralism. Third, nothing in this
Article relied on the collective’s being an officially recognized
sovereign. In fact, the taxonomy can be used to study arbitrary
collectives. All societies are individuals mapped onto a set of manifold
and overlapping collectives. We are citizens of our nation, residents of
our towns, members of the PTA, members of our families, etc. Our
state is a member of our nation, which is a nation state within
various international governing bodies, and so forth. The taxonomy
developed here applies to all of these collectives. And so, every society
is a complex of these taxonomic entities, overlapping and repeated at
multiple scales: in short, pluralistic. Seeing a society as a mosaic and
partially hierarchical mosaic of lawmaking collectives is an exciting
way to understand pluralism. To give some idea, the Criminal Law of
the local PTA might be enforced within the PTA but might also be
reviewable under the Contract Law of the state in which the PTA is
incorporated. So too, the operator of a virtual world may set up rules
for online behavior enforceable in the operator’s own Tort, Contract,
or Criminal Law system. Should those judgments be reviewable, or
other conduct within that collective be enforceable by the “supersovereign,” the state or nation in which the operator and/or
participants exist? The atomic public/private arguments may help
understand these questions better.
Pedagogy. Just as understanding the difference between the
substantive law of Contracts and the Constitutional Law of Contracts
helps us understand the connections between Contracts and other
substantive areas, so too might it help our students. At most U.S. law
schools, the first-year curriculum consists of the following courses:
two courses in the substance of publicly created duties (torts and
criminal law), one in the Constitutional Law of privately created
duties (contracts), one in polymorphic legal forms (property), one in
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procedure,190 and, finally, one in a portion of the Constitutional Law
of publicly created duties.
While scholars have long noticed and are increasingly
appreciating the sui generis and interdisciplinary role of Property,191
little connection has been made between the constitutional law and
contracts courses. And yet, they are in many ways as similar as the
criminal law and torts courses. In each of these similar pairs, we ask
the same questions and arrive at somewhat different answers. Most
of this difference follows from not much more than the fact that one
is public and the other private, as to source in the former case and as
to prosecution in the latter, the atomic arguments at work to
translate between fields.
But this understanding of what we teach also makes plainer what
is left out of the first year study of fundamentals. First, most
contracts courses do not cover the substantive law of Contracts. As
remarked, supra, doing so is not possible in the same sense as is done
with the substantive Tort law. Owing to the simple fact that
substantive, private rulemaking is, well, private, the obligations so
created are manifold and continuously variable. Thus, we do not
teach the “law of private obligations relating to the agreement of X
and Y regarding a particular shipment of chickens” but, instead, the
meta-law, the Constitutional Law, governing the interpretation of
contracts generally, including those contracts related to chicken
commerce. These meta-laws govern the treatment by courts of
privately made laws, dealing with such problems as incompletely
specified contracts that leave out elements like price, a problem of
the interpretation of private statutes, and contracts that are
unconscionable. We teach the substantive law of contracts only
through the series of examples primarily intended to illustrate the
Constitutional Law of Contract.
Second, we do not often teach first year students much of the true
Constitutional Law of Tort and Criminal Law. We focus instead on
190. Curiously, the Procedural Law of publicly enforced claims is often (perhaps
universally) left to law schools’ second and third years and is usually not even a required
course. Though some might argue its fundamental difference, I would submit that teaching
civil procedure goes a long way toward conveying what is needed to understand our
criminal procedure. Though it is easy to emphasize the distinctions, in broad form the
manner of bringing a criminal action and a civil action are nearly isomorphic. What is
distinct merits further study in the form of a course in criminal adjudication, but one can
explain a lot about that topic by noting how our civil procedure must be modified to deal
with the shift in antagonist from a private actor to a public one. In other words, the same
old arguments that explain the different form taken by “legal objects” when in the tort
world rather than the contract world also explain the changed nature of procedural forms
when in a criminal rather than civil setting.
191. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII:
PROPERTY 69-73 (J. Rolan Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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the structure of the federal government and the rights that further
its and its subordinates’ powers. Other aspects of Constitutional Law,
chief among them the implied Constitutional Law under which our
courts operate when they evolve the common law or interpret
statutes is taught only obliquely.
A Typical First-Year
Curriculum

Constitutional Law

Privately Created Publicly Created
(Contracts)
(Constitutional
(course names in italics)
Law)

Procedure

Privately
Enforced
(Civ. Pro.)

Contract
(None)

Tort
(Torts)

Publicly
Enforced
(None)

Parens Patriae
(None)

Criminal Law
(Criminal Law)

But this apparent gap is not a defect of our method. After all, the
goal is to teach law, not the laws. By this I mean to highlight that the
first year is about building a fairly complete set of intuitions and
arguments that need simply to be translated to apprehend a
seemingly new area of law. Once the ideas of structure, rights,
interpretation, and other doctrine are properly appreciated in a
conventional constitutional law course, a student is well prepared to
think about these problems in another setting. And especially so if
these ideas have been reinforced and explicitly connected in the very
different, but conceptually similar, setting of Contract.
Moreover, thinking of Contract Law as that set of law that is
privately determined and privately enforced automatically raises the
relevant questions that a first year contracts course resolves. When
should private parties be able to lay down law that binds other
private parties? The answer, quite clearly, suggests that it may only
be done under voluntary conditions, And so on. A lot of the first year
of contracts that is special to that course is in cashing out
voluntarism and exploring the Constitutional rules meant to police it.
Property. Finally, some readers may notice an apparent gaping
hole in the categorization that is near and dear to my own heart as a
teacher of Property Law: the absence of Property Law. It is my view
that Property Law does not exist as a substantive body of law.
Rather, Property is an example of a very important concept in any
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practical legal regime: polymorphism. The claim here is that law
could not be administered without frequent resort to a small number
of concepts, combined in various ways, and with subtly differing
shades of meaning between the categories in the taxonomy. Property
is perhaps the most important, but not the only, polymorphic legal
object, meaning a concept that has more or less the same meaning in
many different areas of law and so can be used throughout a legal
code without greatly increasing the complexity, and thus cost, of the
system. Consider causation, reliance, due process, and the like, as
other examples of polymorphic legal objects. Behind each such object
are atomic arguments, like the ones discussed here. Importantly,
many of these objects are treated uniformly within the categories in
the model presented here. Many of their differences among categories
can be explained by the institutional differences between public and
private control.
* * *
While the model is primarily integrative of ideas that have existed
in other fields, it is this integration that permits us to see so much,
using so little. Though I have left a great deal undone, I hope that the
rehabilitation of “the” public/private distinction as a fundamental set
of public/private distinctions continues to reveal the inherent
simplicity of our legal system.

